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OLD CONSTITUTIONS AND NEW ISSUES:
NATIONAL LESSONS FROM VERMONT'S
STATE CONSTITUTIONAL CASE ON
MARRIAGE OF SAME-SEX COUPLES
ROBERT F. WILLIAMS *
Abstract: The Vermont Supreme Court's 1999 ruling in Baker v. State
was a watershed decision, holding that same-sex couples in Ver111011t
were entitled to the same benefits and protections as opposite-sex
married couples. While Baker is extremely important as a matter of
substantive law, and as a contribution to the national discussion of the
issues surrounding marriage of same sex-couples, it also provides an
excellent lens through which to consider principles of state
constitutional law and the New Judicial Federalism. This Article
demonstrates how Baker is illustrative of major themes in state
constitutional law, including the use of state constitutional history and
textual analysis, distinctions between federal equal protection
approaches and independent state constitutional equality doctrines,
and plaintiffs' choice of state forum and state constitutional claims. The
Article also shows how Baker highlights the application of a new,
developing state constitutional rights jurisprudence.
INTRODUCTION
In December 1999, the Supreme Court of Vermont decided! Baker
v. State,' a decision that one of the Vermont justices referred to as "the
most closely-watched opinion in this Court's history." 2 All five justices
* Distinguished Professor of Law, Rutgers University School of Law, Camden. I would
like to acknowledge very helpful comments on earlier drafts by Alan Tarr, Charles (Muzzy)
Baron, and Mary Bonanto. This is an expanded version of the William P. flomans Lecture
at the Supreme Judicial Court Historical Society, Boston, Massachttscus, November 8,
2000.
744 A.2d 8G4 (Vt. 1999).
2 Id. at 889 (Dooley, I, concurring). One of the other Vermont justices noted that
"This case is undoubtedly one of the most controversial ever to come before this Court."
Id. at 912 (Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part): For a full treatment of
the events leading up to Baker, and its aftermath, see Michael Mello, For Today I'm Gay: The
Unfinished Battle for Same-Sex Marriage in Vermont, 25 Vr. L. Rev. 149 (2000). For additional
commen tary on the Baker decision, sec Melanie D. Price, The Privacy Paradox: The Divergent
Paths of the United States Supreme Court and State Courts on Issues of Sexuality, 33 IND. L. Rev.
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agreed that denying same-sex couples the benefits and protections
accorded to opposite-sex married couples violated the Vermont state
constitution.3 Chief Justice Jeffrey Amestoy, writing for the majority,
found a violation of the Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont
Constitution, which states:
That government is; or ought to be, instituted for the com-
mon benefit, protection, and security of the people, nation,
or community, and not for the particular emolument or ad-
vantage of any single person, family, or set of persons, who
are a part only of that community . . . .4
The majority opinion did not require marriage licenses to be is-
sued to same-sex couplei, but rather left the question to the Vermont
legislature whether to remedy the constitutional violation by expand-
ing the marriage laws to include same-sex couples, or, as an alterna-
tive, creating a new law that mirrored all of the legal benefits and pro-
tections accorded to married opposite-sex couples.5 Within a matter
of months the Vermont legislature passed, and the governor ap-
proved, a "Civil Union statute reaffirming the limitation of marriage
to opposite-sex couples; but granting all of the benefits of marriage to
same-sex couples."6
863,890-91 (2000); Randall Blandin, Case Note, Baker v. Vermont: The Vermont State Su-
preme Court field Thai Denying Same-Sex Couples the Benefits and Privileges of Marriage Is Uncon-
stitutional, 9 LAw & SEXUALITY 349 (2000); Recent Cases, Same-Sex Marriage—Vermont Su-
preme Court Holds State Must Extend Same-Sex Couples the Same Benefits as Married Opposite-Sex
Couples—Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 964 (Vt. 1999), 113 HARv. L. Rev. 1882 (2000).
In a companion article its this Review, Professors Lawrence Friedman and Charles
Baron provide a thorough and extremely thoughtful analysis of Baker. See Lawrence Fried-
man Charles Baron, Baker v. State and the Promise of the Newiudicial Federalism, 43 B.C. L.
REv. 125 (2001).
3 See Baker, 744 A.2d at 867,887 (Dooley, J., concurring), 898 (Johnson, J., concurring
in part and dissenting in part).
4 VT. CoNsr. ch . I, art. 7. For a brief survey of the interpretations of the C.01M11011
Benefits Clause, see WILLIAM C. HILL, TDE VERMONT STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE
GUIDE 43-45 (1092). Interestingly, in 1994, this provision was made gender-neutral, with-
out intending In "alter the sense, meaning or effect" of it. See VT. Coml.. ch. II, § 76 (revis-
ing Chapters I and II to use gender-neutral language); accord Baker, 744 A.2d at 874 n.6.
5 See Baker-, 744 A.2d at 886-88. But see id. at 898 ( Johnson, J., concurring its part and
dissenting in part) (advocating the issuance of licenses under the formal marriage law to
same-sex couples).
6 See Ch. 91, Vermont Laws of 1999-2000 (approved April 26, 2000) (codified VT. STAT.
ANN. di 15, §§120I-1212 (1989 & 2001 Supp.)); see also Greg Johnson, Vermont Civil Un-
ions: The New Language of Marriage, 25 VT. L. Rev. 15 (2000); Recent Legislation, Domestic
Relations—Same-Sex Couples—Vermont Creates System of Civil Unions.--Act Relating to Civil Un-
ions, No. 91, 2000 Vt. Adv. Legis. Seru 68 (LEXIS), 114 IIARv. L. Rev. 1421 (2001).
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Baker is extremely important as a matter of substantive law, and as
a contribution to the national discussion of the issues surrounding
marriage of same-sex couples. The decision was a major, national
news story in much. the same way as landmark decisions of the United
States Supreme Court. 7 Baker was only the second state constitutional
law decision in the country to mandate a remedy for same-sex couples
who are not seen to be included within the marriage statutes.° The
case also attracted the attention of interest groups, and a wide variety
of amid curiae, both nationally and within Vermont, filed briefs in the
case.9
Perhaps more significantly, Baker provides a lens through which
to review a wide range of important lessons about the "battleground"
of state constitutional law and the New Judicial Federalism. 19 In the
7 See, e.g., John Cloud, A HalfMay if for Gay Couples, TIME, Dec. 31, 1999, at 220; David
G. Savage, Vt. Court Backs Equal Rights for Gay Couples, Los ANGELES TIMES, Dcc. 21, 1999, at
AI.
8 Hawaii decided the first same-sex marriage case in 1993. See Baehr v. Lewin, 852 P.2d
44 (flaw. 1993). See generally WILLIAM N. ESKRIDGE, JR., FROM SEXUAL. LIBERTY TO CIVI-
LIZED COMMITMENT: THE CASE FOR SAME SEX MARRIAGE (1996); William N. Eskridge, Jr.,
A History of Same-Sex Marriage, 79 VA. L. REV. 1419 (1993); Lisa M. Farabee, Marriage, Equal
Protection, and the New Judicial Federalism: A View from the States, 14 YALE L. & POCY REv. 237
(1996); Mark Strasser, Loving in the New Millennium: On Equal Protection and the Right to
Marry, 7 U. Cm. L. Sc". ROUNDTABLE 61 (2000); Evan Wolfson, Crossing the Threshold:
Equal Marriage Rights for lesbians and Gay Men and the Intro-Community Critique, 21 N.Y.U.
REV. L. & Soc. CHANGE 567 (1994). For a very important., cautionary view, sec Sheila Rose
Foster, The Symbolism of Rights and the Costs of Symbolism: Some Thoughts on the Campaign for
Same-Sex Marriage, 7 TEMP. POL. & CIV. Itrs. L. REv. 319 (1998).
In November 1998, the vote's of Hawaii approved an amendment to Article I of the
state constitution, proposed by the Legislature, providing: 'Tiae Legislature shall have the
power to reserve marriage to opposite-sex couples." See Douglas S, Reed, Popular Constitu-
tionalism: Toward a Theory of State. Constitutional Meanings, 30 RUTGERS U. 871, 918-31
(1999) (analyzing the Hawaii constitutional amendment campaign as an example of
"popular constitutionalism"); infra notes 187-189, 292-297 and accompanying text.
9 See Baker, 744 A.2d at 866-67.
See James A. Gardner, Introduction to 1 STATE EXPANSION or FEDERAL. CONSTITU-
TIONAL CIVIL LIBERTIES ix, xxxviii (Pines A. Gardner ed., 1999) (IS(tate constitutional
law (has become) something of a battleground, not only politically, but jurispruden-
tially."); Mary Cornelia, Porter & G. Alan 'Parr, The New Judicial Federalism and the Ohio Su-
preme Court: Anatomy of a Failure, 45 Outo Sr.' L.J. 143, 143 (1984) (noting that "Id luring
the past decade, law journals and other sources have devoted considerable attention to the
emergence of the 'new judicial federalism,' the renewed reliance by state courts on state
constitutions as independent sources of constitutional rights, often with the aim of extend-
ing greater protection to individual liberties than is available under current interpretations
of the federal constitution") (internal citations ommitted).
The analysis of the Baker case contained in this article is an example of a qualitative,
rather than a quantitative, assessment of state constitutional law. See ,James N.G. Cauthen,
Expanding Rights Under State Constitutions: A Qualitative Appraisal, 63 Atm, L. Rev. 1183,
1183-84 (2000).
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last generation or so, state courts have, with some regularity, inter-
preted their state constitutions to provide more protection than the
federal Constitution as interpreted by the United States Supreme
Court.tt Justice William J. Brennan, Jr, called this movement "[t] he
most important development in constitutional jurisprudence of our
times." 12
 The Baker decision is illustrative of every important theme in
the New Judicial Federalism and state constitutional rights protec-
tion." Lessons drawn from Baker include the use of state constitu-
tional history and textual analysis, distinctions between federal equal
protection approaches and independent state constitutional equality
doctrines, and plaintiffs' choice of state forum and state constitu-
tional claims. Additionally, Baker highlights the application of the new,
developing state constitutional rights jurisprudence. It is to these top-
ics that this article will now turn.
See generally Robert F. Williams, Foreword: Looking Back at the New Judicial Federalism's
First Generation, 30 Vu.. U. L. REV. xiii (1096): Dr. G. Alan Tarr has argued that prior to the
beginning of the 1970s, the conditions were not right for the development of an expansive
slate cumin( ional rights jurisprudence. lie noted:
What was missing was a model of how state judges could develop a civil liber-
ties jurisprudence. Because Americans had not come to rely on courts to vin-
dicate civil liberties, state courts throughout the 19th and early 20th centuries
gained little experience in interpreting civil liberties guarantees. Nor could
they look to federal courts for guidance in interpreting their constitutional
projections.... Only when circumstances brought a combination of state
constitutional arguments, plus an example of how a court might develop con-
stitutional guarantees, could a state civil liberties jurisprudence emerge. l'ut
differently, when the Burger Court's anticipated—and to some extent ac-
tual—retreat front the Warren Court activism encouraged civil liberties liti-
gants to look elsewhere for redress, the experience of the preceding decade
had laid the foundation for the development of state civil liberties law.
Paradoxically, then, the activism of the Warren Court, which has been o1
ten portrayed as detrimental to federalism, was a necessary condition for the
emergence of vigorous state involvement in protecting civil liberties.
C. Alan Tarr, The New Judicial Federalism in Perspective, 72 NOME DAME 1. REX% 1097, 1111–
12 (1997).
12
 justice William J. Brennan, Jr., Special Supplement, State Constitutional Law, NAT'L
LI, Sept. 20, 1986, at SI; accord just ice William J. Brennan, Jn, Symposium on the Revolution
in Stale Constitutional Law—Foreword, 13 VT. L. Ray. 1 I, 11 (1988) (calling the movement
"the most significant development in American constitutional jurisprudence today"); Jus-
tice William J. Brennan, Jr., State Constitutions and the Protection of Individual Rights, 90 L%Rv.
L. 14v. 489, 495 (1977).
13 See it
	 text accompanying notes 16, 23.
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I. THEMES OF VERMONT'S STATE CONSTITUTIONAL DEVELOPMENT AND
THE NEW JUDICIAL FEDERALISM
hi 1985, the Vermont Supreme Court rendered State v. Jewett, 14
which is probably the most explicit "teaching opinion" about state
constitutional law.15 Written by the late Justice Thomas L. Hayes, Jewett
outlined the approaches to state constitutional interpretation (his-
torical, textual, comparison to sibling jurisdictions, and analysis of
economic and social materials), 16 cautioning that lilt would be a se-
rious mistake for this Court to 'use its state constitution chiefly to
evade the impact of the decisiOns of the United States Supreme
Court. Our decisions must be principled, not result-oriented." 17 Jus-
tice Hayes explained the reasoning behind writing an opinion aimed
at the bar in connection with the court's order that counsel file sup-
plemental briefs on the state constitutional issues in Jewett:
There was some discussion on the court about publishing
a law review article advising lawyers to look to the state con-
stitution, but I had the feeling that if we took that course the
article would be read by nine students, nine law professors,
and the janitor who was cleaning up at night at the law
school. I believed an article would not get our message
across. Ultimately the court agreed that if we were to tell our
lawyers: "Look to your Vermont constitution and, when you
14 500 A.2d 233 (Vt. 1985).
15 Robert F. Williams, In the Glare of the Supreme Court: Continuing Methodology and Le-
gitimacy Problems in Independent State Constitutional Rights Adjudication, 72 NOTRE Dion. L.
REV. 1015, 1020 (1997). A teaching opiniOn serves the fundion of "alerting the bar and
bench to the possibilities of independent state constitutional analysis, and educating them
in the techniques of making state constitutional arguments." Id. at 1019.
16 See Jewett, 500 A.2d at 235.
0 Id. Justice Hayes continued: "This generation of Vermont lawyers has an unparal-
leled opportunity to aid in the formulation of a state constitutional jurisprudence that will
protect the right's and liberties of our peoPle, however the philosophy of the United States
Supreme Court may ebb and flow." Id.
The Vermont court reiterated this approach in subsequent cases. See State v. lIe-
LaBruere, 577 A.2d 254, 268 (Vt. 1990); see also Stale v. Zumbo, 601 A.2d 986, 988 (Vt.
1991) ("Defendant fails to provide a substantive analysis as to why the Vermont Constitu-
tion should provide a different answer for his argument than the federal constitution.");
State v. Jenne, 591 A.2d 85, 89 (Vt. 1991) ("Vermont's constitutional guarantee to a fair
cross-section ... does not, in this case, prOyide any greater protection than that afforded
by the federal constitution.").
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do, brief it adequately," we could do so only in a judicial
opinion. 18
Justice Hayes also thought that if Vermont developed an inde-
pendent state constitutional jurisprudence, it might "give courage" to
other states to follow the Vermont lead. 19 Jewett set forth a road map or
glossary for what Professor James A. Gardner has referred to as a "dis-
course of distinctness ... a language and set of conventions enabling
participants in the legal system to argue that provisions in the state
constitution mean something different front their federal counter-
parts."2°
A review of Chief Justice Amestoy's majority opinion in Baker v.
State reflects the unmistakable influence of the teachings of Justice
Hayes and his Jewett opinion.21
 During the formative years of the New
Judicial Federalism in Vermont, Chief Justice Amestoy had served as
the state's attorney general and was deeply involved in these devel-
opments. 22
 He introduced his state constitutional analysis in Baker by
noting: "We typically look to a variety of sources in construing our
Constitution, including the language of the provision in question, his-
torical context, case-law development, the construction of similar pro-
visions in other state constitutions, and sociological materials."23
 His
majority opinion reflects each of these elements.
18
 Thomas L. Hayes, Clio in the Courtroom, 56 VT. Ilts-r. 147, 149 (1988); see also Samuel
B. 1-land, The Intellectual Legacy of Justice Thomas Hayes, 56 VT. 1-ItsT. 141, 145-46 (1988).
19 Hayes, supra note 18, at 153.
2° James A. Gardner, The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 Mick!. L. Rev. 761,
778 (1992).
21
 See, e.g., Baker, 744 A.2d at 870 (quoting Jewett, 500 A.2d at 235).
22 Two commentators reported: "Acting in response to the Jewett court's declaration,
the office of the attorney general of Vermont set up a constitutional law conunittee
specifically to research the history and legal precedents connected with the Vermont Con-
stitution." Ronald K.L. Collins & Peter J. Galie, Models of Post-Incorporation Judicial Review:
1985 Survey of State Constitutional Rights Decisions, 55 U. CIN. L. Rrv. 317, 335 (1988). For
views of the then-Attorney General on the reemergence of state constitutional law, see
Jeffrey L. Amestoy . & Julie Brill, Slate Constitutions from the Attorney General's Perspective: An
Institutional Schizophrenia, 1 EMERGING ISSUES IN STATE CONST. L. 229 (1988); Jeffrey L.
Amestoy, State Constitutional Lai& An Attorney General's Perspective, 13 VT. L. REV. 337 (1988).
Then-Attorney General Amestoy noted:
The increasing reliance on state constitutions presents interesting and at
titnes exasperating problems for attorneys general. For if—as more than one
writer has put it—"a state constitution can be used as a sword," one's enthusi-
asm for it depends on whether one is swinging the sword or catching the
blade.
Atnestoy & Brill, supra, at 230.
23 Baker, 744 A.2d at 873; see also Jewett, 500 A.2(1 at 235.
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A. State Constitutional History
In Baker, after analyzing the historical context of the Common
Benefits Clause, Chief justice Antestoy concluded: "flln the faith that
a case beyond the imagining of the framers of our Constitution may, never-
theless, be safely anchored in the values that infused it, we find a con-
stitutional obligation to extend to plaintiffs the common benefits,
protection, and security that Vermont law provides opposite-sex cou-
ples."24 As suggested by the Jewett decision, the state constitutional
analysis in Baker included a searching analysis of the state constitu-
tional history of the Common Benefits Clause. 25 This analysis covered
both state-specific Vermont constitutional history and a wider review
of constitution-making during the Revolution . 26
As legal historian Stephen Gottlieb has observed, analysis of state
constitutional history "is valuable whether or not one subscribes to a
jurisprudence of original intent?" He continued:
For those who reject a jurisprudence of original intent, con-
stitutional history nevertheless helps us to preserve the les-
sons embodied in the drafting of the provisions at issue and
to explore the consequences of the language chosen. State
constitutional history has become more important as the
United States Supreme Court has become less protective of
individual rights."'
Chief Justice Amestoy's use of state constitutional history in Baker
seems clearly to be of the latter sort—not an attempt to discover
original intent in its strict sense. 29 He admitted as much by his ac-
knowledgment that the issues were "beyond the imagining of the
framers of our Constitution?" Chief Justice Amestoy's historical
24 Baker, 744 A.2d at 886 (emphasis added).
25 See id. at 875-77; cf. Jell,e11, 500 A.2d at. 236.
26 See Baker, 744 A.2d at 875-77.
27 Stephen E. Gottlieb, Foreland: Symposium on State Constitutional 	 In Search of a
Usable Past, 53 At.n. L. lbw. 255, 258 (1989); see also Pierre Schlag, Framers' Intent: The Ille-
gitimate Uses of History, 8 U. Pur•r SouNo L. REV. 283 (1985). Fur a review of the debate
over original intent at the federal level, see Randy E. Barnett, An Originalism for Nonorigi-
nalists, 45 Loy. L. REv. 611 (1999).
28 Gottlieb, supra note 27, at 258.
29 cf. id.
" &km; 744 A.2d at 886. Chief justice Atnestoy stated that 1 allthough historical re-
search yields little direct evidence of the framers' intentions, an examination of the ideologi-
cal origins of the Common Benefits Clause casts a useful light upon the inchtsionary princi-
ple at its textual core." Id. at 875 (emphasis added).
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analysis was, rather, a wide-ranging survey of the egalitarian impulses
of the Revolution. 51 Chief Justice Amestoy described the use of state
constitutional history in interpretation as follows:
[T]he responsibility of the Court . . . is distinct from that of
the historian, whose interpretation of past thought and ac-
tions necessarily informs our analysis of current issues but
cannot alone resolve them.... Out of the shifting and com-
plicated kaleidoscope of events, social forces, and ideas that
culminated in the Vermont Constitution of 1777, our task is
to distill the essence, the motivating ideal of the framers.
The challenge is to remain faithful to that historical ideal,
while addressing contemporary issues that the framers un-
doubtedly could never have imagined. 52
In Baker, Chief Justice Amestoy traced the origins and context of
the Common Benefits Clause." As he noted, the Revolution occurred
not only against Great Britain, but also against the elite and aristo-
cratic social, economic, and political structure in the Colonies. 54 His-
torians support his conclusion. Carl Becker wrote that the decade be-
tween 1765 and 1776 witnessed the internal political struggle over
"who should rule at home" as well as the Revolutionary War struggle
for "home rule."35 Even the idea of written constitutions itself was an
egalitarian, inclusive development. 36 In the decade following inde-
31
 See id. at 875-77.
32 Id. at 874.
33 See id. at 877.
34 Id. at 875-76.
35 CARL Lows BECKER, THE 1-IrsTolve OF POLITICAL PARTIES IN THE PROVINCE OF NEW
YORK, 1 760-1 776, at 22 (1909). Becker wrote:
From 1765 to 1776, therefore, two questions, about equally prominent, de-
termined party history. The first was whether essential colonial rights should
be maintained; the second was by whom and by what Methods they should he
maintained. The first was the question of home rule; the second was the ques-
tion, if we may so put it, of who should rule at home.
Id. In Bakes; Chief justice Amestoy stated: "Although aimed at Great Britain, the American
Revolution—as numerous historians have noted—also tapped deep-seated domestic: an-
tagonisms. The planter elite in Virginia, the proprietors of Eastern Pennsylvania, and New
Yorkers claiming Vermont lands were each the object of long-standing grievances." Baker,
744 A.2c1 at 875; see also GORDON S. WOOD, THE CREATION OF THE AMERICAN REPUBLIC
1776-1787, at 83 (1969).
36 See Patrick II. Hutton, The hint Revolution of the Eighteenth Century and the Drafting of
Written Constitutions, 56 VT. HIST. 154,158 (1988). Hutton wrote:
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pendence, the states, in the words of Jackson Turner Main, "became
the laboratories for testing theories, trying the institutions in the vari-
ous forms that presently appeared in constitutions of the United
States and other countries."" Historian Elisha Douglass has noted:
Large numbers of those unable to vote or hold political
office felt that the primary purpose of the struggle was to
abolish the political institutions by which privilege had been
maintained in the colonial' governments. Thus when the
question of home rule was succeeded by the question of who
would rule at home, these groups of humbler rebels at-
tempted to obtain equal consideration for themselves by
demanding that democratic reforms be written into the new
state constitutions."
As Chief Justice Amestoy pointed out, Vermont's first constitution
from 1777 was modeled directly on Pennsylvania's. 39 Historians agree
that Pennsylvania's constitution of 1776 was the most radical of the
Revolutionary state constitutions. 40 In Pennsylvania, a number of for-
mer political outsiders, including Dr. Thomas Young, James Cannon,
and George Bryan, drafted the state's "ultrademocratic" 1776 consti-
The growing importance attached to written consdintions reveals the change
ill mentality that had been worked by the spread of print culture between the
sixteenth and the eighteenth cenutries. By the eighteenth century, the mid-
dle class, then on the verge of acquiring political power, had learned to read.
Reading was of fundamental importance became it promoted a transforma-
tion in the way humans learn. Reading involved a move from learning
through hearing to learning through seeing, a change that had tar-reaching
implications for political culture.
Id.
" ,Jackson Turner Main, The American States hi the Revolutionary by, in SOVEREIGN
S'EATES IN AN AGE OF UNCERTAINTY I, 23 (Ronald Hoffman & Peter . J. Albert eds., 1 9 8 1 ) .
See generally MARC W. KRIUMAN, BETWEEN AUTHORITY AND LIBERTY: STATE CONSTITUTION
MAKING IN REVOLUTIONARY AMERICA (1997); 0. Alan Tarr, Between Authority and Liberty:
State Constitution Making in Revolutionary America, by Mai* IV Kruman, University of North
Carolina Mess, 1997, 28 RUTGERS LT 865 (1997) (book review).
38 ELLSHA P. DOUGLASS, REBELS AND DEMOCRATS: THE STRUGGLE FOR EQUAL POLITI-
CAL RIGHTS AND THE MAJORITY RULE DURING Tur. AMERICAN REVOLUTION Vi (1955); see
also GARY B. NASH, THE URBAN CRUCIBLE: SOCIAL. CHANGE, POLITICAL CONSCIOUSNESS,
AND THE ORIGINS OF THE AMERICAN REVOLUTION 340 (1979) (describing the internal
struggle for new social order).
39 Baker, 744 A.2d at 875. This phenomenon of state constitutional borrowing is dis-
cussed infra notes 153-154 and accompanying text.
40SeeCecelia M. Kenyon, Constitutionalism in Revolutionary America, in CONSTITUTIO NA
ISM: NOMOS XX 84, 99 (J. Roland Pennock & John W. Cltapinan eds., 1979).
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tution. 41
 Thomas Paine referred to the Pennsylvania Constitution of
1776 as "a generous Constitution ... which considers mankind as they
came from their maker'S hands—a mere man, before it can be known
what shall be his fortune or his state . ."42 It contained a separate
Declaration of Rights and Frame of Government. 43 The Declaration of
Rights, patterned after Virginia's, 44 contained a Common Benefits
Clause.45 The Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 mirrored the ex-
treme shift in the political structure of the state and was a reflection
of an "urban variant of republicanism that fostered egalitarianism as
well as economic enterprise:46 Pennsylvania, in making a virtually
complete change of its government, thus was the only colony to expe-
rience a true revolution. 47
 According to Richard Ryerson, "By late
1776 the Commonwealth of Pennsylvania was perhaps the most vital
participatory democracy' in the world."48
The Pennsylvania Constitution proved influential beyond the
state, particularly in Vermont.49
 The drafters of the Pennsylvania Con-
stitution of 1776 sent copies to representatives of Vermont, 50
 who
came to Philadelphia to lobby the Continental Congress to recognize
their statehood.51
 Dr. Thomas Young, a key Pennsylvania radical con-
stitutionalist and long-time friend of Vermont's Ethan Allen, pub-
41
 RICHARD ALAN RYERSON, THE REVOLUTION IS Now BEGUN: THE RADICAL COMMIT-
TEES OF PIIILADELPIIIA, 1765-1776, at 241,11.147 (1978).
42 2 THIS: COMPLETE 'WRITINGS or THOMAS PAINE 285 (Philip S. Potter ed., 1945).
43
 PA CONST, OF 1776, art. I, 1.
J. PAUL SELSAM, THE PENNSYLVANIA CONSTITUTION OF 1776: A STUDY OF REVOLU-
TIONARY DEMOCRACY 178 (1936).
45
 PA CONST, OF 1776, art. I, § V.
46 Robert E. Shalhope, Republicanism and Early American Historiography, 39 Wm. & MARY
Q. 334,341 (1982).
• 7
 Tin: Pennsylvania experience with a real "revolution" should be contrasted with the
more general view of the American Revolution, summarized by A.E. Dick Howard: "But
the American revolution is a kind of oddity among revolutions. It was [ought to preserve
old values—indeed, to preserve valves which had sprung up from the very country re-
belled against, but which that country had somehow forgotten." A.E. Dick HOWARD, THE
ROAD FROM RUNNYMEDE: MAGNA CARTA AND CONSTITUTIONALISM IN AMERICA 203 (1968).
43 RYERSON, supra note 41, at 5; see also id, at 252 (The Pennsylvania Constitution of
17711 contained the "broadest franchise of any large polity in the world").
43 See Kenyon, supra note 40; at 99; see also Baker, 744 A.2d at 875. Chief justice Amestoy
concluded that the egalitarianism of the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776 was arguably
eclipsed the following year by the Vermont_ Constitution of 1777." Baker, 744 A.2d at 876.
w	 supra note 4, at 4; Paul Gillies, Not Quite d State of Nature: Derivations of Early
Vermont Law, 23 V-r. L. REV. 99, 197 (1998).
51 See WILLIAM BREWSTER, THE FOURTEENTH COMMONWEAUTH: VERMONT AND THE
STATES TIIAT FAILED 27-28 (1960).
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lished a letter, addressed to Vermonters, on April 11 and 12, 1777. 52
Young offered the Pennsylvania Constitution "as a model, which, with
very little alteration, will, in my opinion, come as near perfection as
anything yet concocted by mankind." 55 He even claimed that Con-
gress was disposed to grant Vermont statehood. 54 After concluding
that the recent, more conservative New York Constitution of 1777 was
a "horrible example,"55 Vermonters proposed a constitution modeled
closely after Pennsylvania's. 56
Vermont's origins as a state arose from the "authority of squatter
sOvereignty."57 In rebelling against the authority of New York and New
Hampshire, the state engaged in what Chief Justice Amestoy referred
to as a "double revolution—a rebellion within a rebellion." 58 Vermon-
ters' attempts at convincing the Continental Congress to grant state-
hood, based on many of the same self-determination arguments sup-
porting the Revolution against England, failed because Congress was
more preoccupied in preserving peace with and between New York
and New Hampshire than it was in admitting a new state over their
objections and potentially shifting the balance of power in New Eng-
land. 59 As one historian put it, "When Vermont became independent,
it became independent of all the world, and remained so until 1791
52 BREWSTER, supra note 51, at 9; MATT BUSHNELL JONES, VERMONT IN THE MAKING
1750-1777, at 379 (1939); Caryl Aichelc, Making the Vermont Constitution: 1777-1824, 56
VT. rhsT. 166,178-79 (1988).
55 See JONES, supra note 52, at 380; Gillies, supra note 50, at 107. But see Aichele, supra
note 52, at 175-76 (contending iiml the 1777 Verinont Constitution slid nut adhere as
closely to Pennsylvania's as is commonly thought). Appended to Young's letter alas a copy
of the Continental Congress Resolutions of May 10 and 15,1776. JoNns, supm note 52, at
380. Young's letter had been the first In suggest the name "Vermont." See id. at 383-84.
" See HILL, supra note 4, at 4; Aichele, supra note 52, al 179; Gillies, supra note 50, at
107.
55 BREWSTER, supra note 51, at 29; see also joNEs, supra note 52, at 382 ("The straw that
broke the oppoSition to an independent state and overcame the loyalty to New York ...
was the adoption by New York in April of a conservative state constitution.").
58 See 'WILLI PAUL ADAMS, THE FIRST AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONS: REPUBLICAN IDE01-
OGY AND TUE MAKING or STATE CONSTITUTIONS IN TOE REVOLUTIONARY ERA 94 (1980);
JACKSON TURNER MAIN, 'DIE SOVEREIGN STATES, 1775-1783, at 176 (1973); see also M.J.C.
VILE, CoNSTITUTIONAUSM AND 'HIE SEPARATION OF Powrits 140 (1967).
57 BREWSTER, supra note 51, at xi.
m Eakin; 744 A.2d at 876. See generally ROBERT E. SHALHOPE, BENNINGTON AND •1•11E
GREEN MOUNTAIN BOYS: 'TIE EMERGENCE OF LIBERAL DEMOCRACY IN VERMONT, 1760-
1850 (1996). Vermont's 1777 Constitution contained grievances against both England and
New York. ]MILL, supra note 4, at 6.
59 See ADAMS, 511pra note 56, at 103-25; see generally PETER S. ONUF, THE ORIGINS OF
THE FEDERAL. REPUBLIC: JURISDICTIONAL
;
 CONTROVERSIES IN '1'11E UNITE!) S'AT'ES, 1775—
1787, at 103-25 (1983).
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when it was finally admitted to the union." 60 Therefore, he concluded,
"Vermont was the only true American republic, for it alone had truly
created itself "61
The historical events leading to the constitutions of both Penn-
sylvania and Vermont reflected fundamental Revolutionary debates
about equality, the social contract, and the structure and purposes of
govermnent.62
 In this light, the Common Benefits Clause in Vermont,
and provisions like it in other states, can he seen as foundational rec-
ognitions of the nature of people themselves, and the basic reasons
for forming governments. Therefore, equality was viewed, in Ronald
Dworkin's modern term, as a "sovereign virtue" of government. 63
Moreover, provisions such as Vermont's Common Benefits Clause
reflect important community-based concerns as well as individual
rights concerns."
The Baker court's use of constitutional history is, however, not
without controversy. One criticism of the Baker court's reliance on the
Revolutionary "inclusionary principle," which arose from "deep-
seated domestic antagonisms," 65
 might be that these egalitarian im-
pulses were highly contested by elites who had been used to deference
and who possessed what they considered a natural right to control
60 See ONUF, supra note 59, at 127.
61
 Id. at 145.
52
 One well-known scholar has noted that New England state constitutions such as
Vermont's, in contrast to pat tents in other regions,
are basically philosophic documents designed first and foremost to set a di-
rection for civil society and to express and institutionalize a theory of republi-
can government.... These constitutions, as brief or briefer than the federal
document, concentrate on selling forth the philosophic basis for popular
government, guaranteeing the fundamental rights of the individual, and de-
lineating the elements of the state's government in a few broad strokes,
l)anicl j. Elazar, The Pfineiples arid Traditions Underlying State Constitutions, 12 Pontius: THE
J. OF FEDERALISM 11, 18 (1982). On the centrality of the equality component of republican
political discourse, see Wool), supra note 35, at 70-75 (describing the tension between
notions of equality of opportunity (accepting social differences and distinctions) and
equality of condition (a social leveling, denying social differences and distinctions)). Ott
social contract thinking during the Revolution, sec id. at 282-91,607-08.
63 See generally RONALD DWORKIN, SOVEREIGN VutTuF.: Tur. THEORY AND PRACTICE OF
EquALrry (2000); see also generally John Marquez Lunch!), The Late of Equality Before Equality
Was Law, 49 SYRACUSE L. REV. 1137 (1999).
r" Robert C. Palmer, Liberties as Constitutional Provisions, 1776-1791, in WILLIAM E.
NELSON & ROBERT C. PALMER, LIBERTY AND COMMUNITY: CONSTITUTION AND RIGHTS IN
TILE EARLY AMERICAN REPUBLIC 55,55,61,62-64 (1987).
55 See infra notes 272-276 and accompanying text.
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govermnent.66 Much of the equality rhetoric was aimed at the Brit-
ish.° It is true that the elites compromised their objections to a wider
role for the former outsiders, leading to a variety of constitutional ac-
commodations for participation in government through office hold-
ing and voting as well as equality provisions such as the Common
Benefits Clause. 68 Still, one must be careful not to view a constitu-
tional history as providing a single truth. As H. Jefferson Powell cau-
tioned:
We cannot assume, as a matter of a priori truth, that there is a
unitary tradition of constitutional law across the several
states or even within a single one. The existence of a mean-
ingful tradition is an assertion to be proven rather than a
premise to be assumed. This is a point of more than "mere"
methodological significance. One of the most common
sources of misunderstanding and anachronism in constitu-
tional history stems from the desire to identify a common set
of ideas and arguments shared by groups labeled "the foun-
ders," "framers," "'traditional' constitutional lawyers," or
similar appellations. This desire easily leads one to find more
agreement and intelligibility in the past than was in fact
there.69
Another criticism of Baker's use of history might be that the con-
stitutional history of the Common Benefits Clause reflects majori-
tarian concerns about special privileges for an elite minority." In the
modern context, lesbians and gay men are not in the majority; in fact,
the reverse is true. Can such a provision be invoked to protect against
66 See, e.g., Robert F. Williams, The State Constitutions of the Founding Decade: Pennsylva-
nia's Radical 1776 Constitution and Its Influence on American Constitutionalism, 62 TEMP. L.
REV. 541 (1989).
Robert. F. Williams, Equality Guarantees in State Constitutional Law, 63 Tim L. Rtw.
1195,1198-99 (1985); see ADAMS, supra note 56, at 165; see alto Juorrn A. 13AER, EqUALITY
UNDER THE CONSTITUTION: RECLAIMING THE FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT 38-56 (1983)
(discussing the philosOphical roots of equality in colonial Anierica); J.R.	 Ti rh. PUR-
SUIT OF Equikury IN AMERICAN HISTORY 14 (1978) (discussing colonists' recognition of
need to assert. equal rights); Edward S. Corwin, The "Higher Law" Background of American
Constitutional Law, 42 HARV. L. REV. 365,394-401 (1929) (discussing colonists' attempts to
invoke social contract principles to invalidate acts of Parliament).
68 See supra text accompanying note 38.
co II. Jefferson Powell, The Uses of State Constitutional History: A Case Note, 53 At.n. L.
REV. 283,283-84 (1989).
70 Chief Justice Amestoy himself recognized this point. Baker; 744 A.2d at 876-77; see
also infra notes 106,110 and accompanying text.
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discrimination aimed at minority rights? It does seem that the com-
mon benefit thrust of both the constitutional text and the judicial ap-
proach developed by Chief Justice Amestoy is broad enough to pro-
tect minority rights. 71
Analysis of, and reliance on, state constitutional history has been
an integral part of the New Judicial Federalism." This is partially be-
cause, in contrast to federal constitutional history, more details are
available at the state level." Additionally, as Dr. G. Alan Tarr has
pointed out, a careful look at state constitutional history (in addition
to textual differences) could be used to justify an interpretation of the
state constitution that was more protective, or recognized greater
rights, than those available at the federal leve1. 74 The Baker court's re-
liance on the egalitarian anti-aristocracy flavor of the first state consti-
tutions stands in sharp contrast to the constitutional history of the
federal Equal Protection Clause."
B. Textual Analysis in Baker
The landmark Jewett decision specified textual analysis as an im-
portant way to analyze the potential differences in state and federal
constitutional law." Dr. Tarr also has pointed out the appeal of textu-
alism, in addition to historical analysis, as a method to support a state
constitutional decision going beyond federal constitutional minimum
standards." Further, Chief Justice Amestoy employed a textual analy-
71 See generally Baker 744 A.2d at 877-78.
72
 See, e.g., Jewett, 500 A.24 at '236.
73 See 0. Alan Tarr, Constitutional Theory and State Constitutional Interpretation, '22 Rm .-
GERS L.J. 841,852 (1991).
74 Id. at 848 (111f a divergent interpretation may be justified by reference to the dis-
tinctive origins or purpose of a provision, then state jurists must pay particular attention to
the intent of the framers and to the historical circumstances out of which the constitu-
tional provisions arose.").
73 See 0. ALAN TARR, UNDERSTANDING STATE CONSTITUTIONS 191-93 (1998); see also
Baker, 744 A.2t1 at 870.
76
 &elm*, 500 A.2c1 at 235.
77
	MOM note 73, at 847-48 (“1Elven when slate and federal constitutions con-
tained analogous provisions, die language of the provisions often differed; and where
these textual differences were subseunial, they seemed to call for independent interpreta-
tion. Titis was especially true when it could be shown that the textual differences reflected
a distinctive historical experience or were designed to incorporate a particular perspec-
tive."); see also Joseph R. Grodin, Commentary: Some Reflections on Slate Constitutions, 15 liAsT-
/NGS CONST. L.Q. '391,400 (1988) rite presence of distinctive language or history obvi-
ously presents the most comfortable context for relying upon independent state
grounds."); Peter Linzer, Why Bother with Slate Bills of Rights?, 68 TE.x. L. REV. 1573,1584-85,
1607-08,1610 (1990).
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sis when interpreting the text of the Common Benefits Clause in
Baker. 78
Obviously, the Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont state
constitution reads very differently from the federal Equal Protection
Clause and has very different origins," This should not be surprising
because the state and federal governments constitute very different
polities with very different governmental functions. The federal gov-
ernment exercises limited, delegated powers in contrast to the states'
plenary, residual authority. No one would have expected the federal
Constitution to provide any sort of guarantee about the "benefit, pro-
tection, and security of the people." 8° Historically, that was a function
of state governmental
Chief Justice Amestoy pointed out in Baker that the "first point to
be observed about the text is the affirmative and unequivocal mandate
of the first section, providing that government is established for the
common benefit of the people and community as a whole."82 This no-
tion of affirmative rights is a very important way to distinguish state
constitutional rights from the more familiar, negatively-phrased fed-
eral constitutional rights." Chief Justice Amestoy was able to discern
from the text of the clause "broad principles which usefully inform"
the decision on the constitutionality of a statute. As he stated, "Chief
among these is the principle of inclusion."84
Next, Chief Justice Amestoy responded to the possible textual
argument that the introductory phrase in the Common Benefits
Clause—"that government is, or ought to be, instituted for the common
benefit"—rendered the provision judicially unenforceable, 88 Scholars
have pointed out the admonitory quality of the early state rights pro-
" See generally I3aker; 744 A.2d 864.
79 SeeTmtu, supra note 75, at 191-93; see also Baker, 744 A.2d at 870.
♦° S[.'eVT. CONST. C11. 1, art. 7.
HI See DANIEL J. ELAZAR, THE AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL TRADITION 169 (1988)
1 hereinafter ELAZAR, TRADITION]: Daniel J. Maim., Foreword: The Moral Compass of State Con-
stitutionalism, 30 IturGeRs L.J. 849 (1909) [hereinafter Einar, Foreaval] •
92 Baker, 744 A.2d at 874; see also id. at 875 (noting the "affirmative right to the 'com-
mon benefits and protections' of government").
83 For criticism of the negative rights focus of federal constitutional law, see Small
Bandes, The Negative Constitution: A Ctitique, 88 MICH. L. REV. 2271 (1990); Steven J. Hey-
man, The. First Duty of Government: Protection, Liberty and the Fourteenth Amendment, 41 DUKE
Lj. 507 (1991). This characterization of state constitutional rights as "affirmative" has
been important also in the area of free speech on private property. See, e.g., State v.
Schmid, 423 A.2d 615, 626 (NJ. 1980), appeal dismissed sub nom, Princeton Univ. v. Schmid,
455 U.S. 100 (1082); Cimmionwealth v. Tate, 432 A.2d 1382, 1387 (Pa. 1081).
44 Baker, 744 A.2d at 875.
" Id. at 874 81.7; accord VT. CONSI'. Ch. 1, art. 7.
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visions as "defects,"86 and the Vermont Supreme Court had ruled in
1994 that another provision of the declaration of rights was not judi-
cially enforceable. 87 Chief Justice Amestoy, however, noted that the
Common Benefits Clause is obligatory, and that "the State does not
argue that it is merely hortatory or aspirational in effect, an argument
that would not be persuasive in any event." 88
Chief Justice Amestoy deftly utilized the actual words of the
Common Benefits Clause repeatedly throughout his opinion in de-
scribing the factual situation and the plaintiffs' claims based on denial
86 E.g., BERNARD SCHWARTZ, THE GREAT Ricarrs OF MANKIND: A HISTORY OF THE
AMERICAN BILL or RIG' rrs 91 (1977). Schwartz noted:
The Virginia Declaration of Rights has the defect of being written in terms of
admonition, not legal command. Most of its provisions state the different
rights protected and then go on to provide that they "ought not" to be
abridged. Not once is there a "shall not "--which, in legal terms, imposes an
unmistakable mandatory restriction that the courts can then enforce.
The [Virginia] precedent was followed in the Pennsylvania, Delaware,
Maryland, North Carolina, and Vermont Declarations of Rights.
Id.; see also Kenyon, supra note 40, at 96-99.
87 See Henning v. State, 641 A.2d 757,761 (Vt. 1994). In Berthing, the Vermont Supreme
Court. rejected plaintiffs' argument that the Vermont motorcycle crash helmet law violated
the Vermont Constitution. See id. at 758. The court focused on Chapter 1, Article 1, which
states: "That all men are born equally free and independent, and have certain natural,
inherent, and unalienable rights, amongst which are the enjoying and del ending life and
liberty, acquiring, possessing and protecting property, and pursuing and obtaining happi-
ness and safety ...." VT. CONST, Cll. I, art. 1; see Berthing, 641 A.2d at 759. According to the
Ben ling court:
We find sparse help for the plaintiffs in the text of Article 1 and in our deci-
sions construing this text. The constitutions of New England states have been
described as basically philosophic documents designed first and foremost to
set a direction for civil society and to express and institutionalize a theory of
republican government. . . . [Article 1 reflects] the fundamental principles,
not of our state only, but of Anglo-Saxon government itself, enlarging upon
the axiom that when the facts are the same the law is the same, and inspired
by the ideal of justice, that the law is no respecter of persons. Given the na-
ture of Article 1, it is not surprising that we can discover no instance where
this Court has struck down an act of the Vermont Legislature solely because
of a violation of Article I.
Id. at 759 (internal citations omitted). The court concluded: "iWie are not convinced that
Article 1 offers plaintiffs any special protections that are applicable to this case. . . . As a
result, we reject the notion that this case can be resolved on the basis of a broad right to be
let alone without government interference." Id. at 761.
The Nev Jersey Supreme Court, by contrast, has relied on a virtually identical provi-
sion to develop judicially-enforceahle equality, due process, and privacy doctrines. See ROB-
ERT F. WILLIAMS, THE NEW IERSEY STATE CONSTITUTION: A REFERENCE GUIDE 28-31
(1990).
88 Baker, 744 A.2d at 874-75 n.7.
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of the "benefits," "protection," and "security" offered by Vermont
marriage law to same-sex couples. 89 He even introduced his opinion
with the following question: "May the State of Vermont exclude same-
sex couples from the benefits and protections that its laws provide to
opposite-sex married couples?"" This is a powerful and convincing
use of state constitutional text.
C. Equality Without Equal Protection
The Vermont Constitution does not contain an equal protection
clause. 91 Like many states with similar constitutions, the Vermont judi-
cial interpretations of its equality provision, the Common Benefits
Clause, nevertheless have been deeply influenced by, and sometimes
seemingly dependent upon, federal equal protection analysis. 92 Con-
sequently, in the Baker decision, both Chief Justice Amestoy and Jus-
tice Dooley expended significant effort attempting to unravel Ver-
mont's equality doctrine and determining whether to treat it as
independent from the federal Equal Protection Clause,"
Justice Dooley, in fact, asserted in his concurrence that Vermont
was bound by precedent to apply the federal equal protection ap-
89 Id. at 867, 870, 871, 878, 879, 880, 881, 882, 883, 884, 886.
99 Id, at 867.
91 See generally Robert. F. Williams, supra note 67, at 1196 ("Most state constitutions do
not contain an 'equal protection' clause. But they do contain a variety of equAity protec-
tions."). For further elaboration of the differences between federal equal protection and
state equality provisions, see Robert F. Williams, A "Row of Shadows": Pennsylvania's Mis-
guided Lockstep Approach to Its State Constitutional Equality Doctrine, 3 WIDENER J. Pun. L. 343
(1993); Robert F. Williams, Foreword: The Importance of an Independent Stale Constitutional
Equality Doctrine in School Finance Cases and Beyond, 24 CONN. L. REV. 675 (1992). Contra Paid
E. McCrea], Alaska Equal Protection: Constitutional Law or Common Law?, IS ALASKA L. Ray.
209 (1998). For an excellent treatment of equality provisions in state constitutions, see I
JENNIFER FRIESEN, STATE CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: LITIGATING INDIVIDUAL. RIGHTS, CLAIMS
AND DEFENSES 3-1 to 3-55 (3d ed. 2000).
92 Williams, supra note 67, at 1197. Part. of this is attributable to lawyers, the lay under-
standing of constitutional law, and the dominance of federal constitutional analysis. As
Justice flans A. Lit ide has noted:
People do not claim rights against self-incrimination; they "take the fifth" and
expect "Miranda" warnings. Unlawful searches are equated with fourth
amendment violations. Journalists do not invoke freedom of the press; they
demand their first. amendment rights. All claims of unequal treatment are phrased
as denials of equal protection of the laws.
Hans A. Linde, E Phtriblts—Constitutional Theory and Stale Courts, 18 GA. L. REV. 165, 174-75
(1984) (emphasis added).
93 See Baker, 744 A.2d at 870, 893.
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proach to the Common Benefits Clause." The question of whether a
state court's earlier decisions adopting one methodology or another
are actually precedent-setting, and therefore binding, is a very impor-
tant matter. 95 As Justice Robert Utter of the Washington Supreme
Court pointed out, state- courts should carefully scrutinize older cases
using federal analysis "to determine whether [their pronouncements]
constitute actual holdings, and if not, whether they were based on as-
sumptions that are no longer valid." 96 This is particularly important
with respect to equality provisions, where there has been so much
misplaced reliance on federal analysis. 97 In many states including
Vermont, whose courts have said on occasion that state equality provi-
sions are no different from the equal protection clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment,98 there is at least a conflict of authority.
Justice Dooley therefore advocated resolving the case by applying
the familiar, "rigid" three-tiered suspect class/fundamental rights ap-
proach used in federal courts, 99 but with a result different from the
likely federal outcome because of the different and smaller "legal cli-
mate" in Vermont.'°° For his assessment of the Vermont legal climate,
Justice Dooley relied on Vermont statutes that decriminalized homo-
sexual conduct and prohibited discrimination based on sexual orien-
tation." Justice Dooley concluded that lesbians and gay men were a
suspect class and applied strict .scrutiny. 102 He therefore maintained
the distinction between "civil rights" and "economic discrimination"
cases, 103
 imposing in the former a more searching judicial inquiry and
a much greater burden on the government to justify the
94 Id. at 893. See Williams, supra note 67, at 1219 (describing situations where "the state
court adopts the federal fiance of analysis but applies those constructs independently").
For an assessment of Baker's equality analysis, see Friedman & Baron, supra note 2, at 129-
49; Mark Strasser, Equal Protection at the Crossroads: On Baker, Common Benefits, and Facial
Neutrality, 42 Atuz. L. REV. 935 (2000).
" SeeTARK, supra note 75, at 197.
96 Robert F. Utter, Freedom and Diversity in a Federal System: Perspectives on State Constitu-
tions and the Washington Declaration of Rights, 7 U. Pucci' SOUND L. IlEv. 491, 507 (1984).
For a strong critique of the Oregon Supreme Court's failure to follow a methodology it set
out, see Jack L. Landau, Hurrah for Revolution: A Critical Assessment of State Constitutional
Interpretation, 79 O. L. REV. 793 (2000).
97 Williams. itlPra note 67, at 1219.
" Id.
" Baker, 744 A.2d at 89&-97.
im See id. at 89! ("My point here is simply' that the rationale in federal decisions for
withholding a more searching scrutiny does not apply in Vermont.").
tot hi .
1 °2 Id. at 890-01.
100 Id. at 890.
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classification.'" Justice Dooley's analysis followed the Oregon ap-
proach, based on that state's similar constitutional provision. 1 °5 The
Oregon Supreme Court described its equality clause as follows:
Article I, section 20, of the Oregon Constitution has been
said to be the "antithesis" of the equal protection clause of
the fourteenth amendment. While the fourteenth amend-
ment forbids curtailment of rights belonging to a particular
group or individual, article 1, section 20, prevents the en-
largement of rights. There is an historical basis for this dis-
tinction. The Reconstruction Congress, which adopted the
fourteenth amendment in 1868, was concerned with dis-
crimination against disfavored groups or individuals,
specifically, former slaves. When article 1, section 20 was
adopted as a part of the Oregon Constitution nine years ear-
lier, in 1859, the concern of its drafters was with favoritism
and the granting of special privileges for a select few.w°
Chief Justice Amestoy, by contrast, distinguished the Vermont
Common Benefits Clause front the federal Equal Protection Clause, 1 °7
articulating and applying a standard different from the federal ap-
proach. He concluded that although the "federal amendment may
104 Batten 744 A.2d at 893-94.
I" Id. at 892-93.
06 Matter of Compensation of Williams, 653 P.2d 970,975 (Or. 1982) (citations omit-
ted). On Oregon's provision, see generally David Schuman, The Right to "Equal Privileges
and Immunities": A State's Version of "Equal Protection,"13 VT. L. REV. '221 (1988). Schuman
asserted that fifteen states have provisions like Oregon's. /4. at 223. De noted the differ-
ences between these types of provisions and an equal protection clause:
An "equal protection" guarantee typically emanates from the privileged as a
self-limiting gesture of largess toward t he burdened: "we hereby grant equal
treatment to you." It is a promise to adhere to the equality principle....
Conversely, state "equal privileges and immunities" provisions typically
emanate front the non-privileged as a gesture of warning to those who have
or seek special benefits; they arc an implied threat to adhere to the equably
principle.
Id. at 224-25; see also David Schuman; Advocacy of State Constitutional Law Cases: A Report
from the Provinces, 2 EMERGING ISSUES IN Si'. CONST. L. 275,281-82 (1989) (discussing the
Oregon provision). Schuman concluded: "If a state's equality guarantee requires all citi-
zens to have equal privileges and inununities, then an approach that extends equality with
respect only to rights the court decides arc 'fundamental' is analytically bankrupt, because
the text itself precludes ranking or prioritizing rights." Id. at 285.
107 Daher, 744 A.2d at 870-79. Another state court that recently confronted the prob-
lem of untangling its seemingly interdependent federal and state constitutional equality
doctrines is the Indiana Supreme Court. SeeCollins v. Day, 644 N.E.2d 72 (Ind. 1994).
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supplement" the Vermont Constitution, it could not "supplant" it108
As noted earlier, he relied on the egalitarian impulses of the social
and political revolution within the Revolution generally, as well as the
principle of inclusion at the core of the text of the Common Benefits
Clause. 1 °9 He cautioned that the framers, "although enlightened for
their day, were not principally concerned with civil rights for African-
Americans and other minorities, but with equal access to public
benefits and protections for the community as a whole." 11 ° He did
note that the Vermont Constitution of 1777 was the only Revolution-
ary constitution to abolish slavery, 111
 which certainly reflected some
concern for African-Americans. The Vermont anti-slavery clause was
an important symbolic statement, but as one historian noted, the pro-
vision "may have freed a few score persons. "112
Chief Justice Amestoy's assessment of Vermont equality jurispru-
dence, stripped of reliance on federal equal protection constructs,
was a standard that he said exhibited deference to "the legislative pre-
rogative to define and advance governmental ends, while vigorously
ensuring that the means chosen bear a just and reasonable relation to
the governmental objective."'" This is, of course, an independent
state constitutional doctrine and the point on which Justice Dooley
disagreed.'" Chief Justice Amestoy continued, rejecting the "rigid,
multi-tiered" federal equal protection analysis and stating that the first
issue was to define which "part of the community" was disadvantaged
by the statute. 115 Then the inquiry moved to the "statutory basis," dis-
tinguishing those protected from those eXcluded." 6 He cautioned
that the court's "concern here is with delineating, not with labeling
the excluded class" for purposes of tiers of scrutiny.'" The next focus
of the court's equality analysis was on the "government's purpose in
drawing a classification," including some within the statute's protec-
tions and excluding others. 018 Then, the court determined whether
IN Baker, 744 A.2d at 870.
10 See supra notes 34-38 and 82-84 and accompanying text.
II° Baker, 744 A.2d at 870,876.
Id.; see ADAms, supra note 56, at 6, 158; BREWSTER, Supra note 51, at 29.
112 MAIN, SUpal note 56, at 337.
113 Baker, 744 A.2d at 871.
114 See supra notes 99-100 and accompanying text; see also Friedman & Baron, supra
note 2, ai 136-37.
115 Baker, 744 A.2d at 878.
116 Id.
117 Id.
110
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the omission bore a "reasonable and just relation to the governmental
purpose." Chief Justice AmestOy concluded that this approach
would necessitate some weighing of interests, but that this could re-
main "grounded and objective, and not based upon the private sensi-
tivities or values of individual judges" by looking to the history and
traditions of the state.'" He conceded, however, that judges' "rea-
soned judgments" would have to be applied. 121
The key to application of Chief Justice Amestoy's analysis is, of
course, to identify the governmental purpose for the exclusion and
then to evaluate whether it is just and reasonable. The state of Ver- .
mont advanced the main purpose for excluding same-sex couples
from the benefits and protections of the marriage laws as "furthering
the link between procreation and child rearing." 122 While acknowl-
edging that this was a valid governmental purpose, Chief Justice
Amestoy was able to show that, based on the fact that many married
opposite-sex couples do not procreate, and that advances in assisted-
reproductive techniques and liberalized adoption policies seemed
inconsistent with the government's stated purpose, the exclusion was
not reasonably related to the purpose. 125 Characterizing the benefits
of marriage as "vital personal rights,"124 he concluded that the state
purposes did not meet the heavy burden to justify the exclusion. 125
Interestingly, much of the evidence Chief Justice Amestoy used to
demonstrate the "extreme logical disjunction • between the
classification and the stated purpose of the law" 125 consisted of statutes
enacted by the State of Vermont itself to ease restrictions on homo-
sexual conduct, to ban discrimination and hate crimes against gays
and lesbians, and to permit same-sex couples to adopt childre11. 127
This is similar to the reasoning of the Florida Supreme Court in its
landmark abortion ruling in 1989, striking clown a parental consent
statute. 128 That court cited statutes permitting pregnant minors to
Id. at 879.
129 Baker, 744 A.2d at 879 (quoting Poe v. Ullman, 367 U.S. 497, 542 (1961) (Harland.,
dissenting)).
121 Id.
02 Id. at 881,
123 Id. at 881-82.
124 Id. at 883.
125 Barr, 744 A.2d at 884.
1261d.
127 Id. at 882, 885-86.
128 In re T.W., 551 So. 2d 1186, 1195 (Ha. 1989); see also Planned Parenthood of Cent.
N.J. v. Farmer, 762 A.2d 620, 636 (NJ. 2000).
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consent to all forms of medical treatment, except abortion, associated
with pregnancy to counter the state's asserted interest in protecting
young women. 129
 In Vermont, the state additionally relied on other
purposes for the exclusion, such as promoting child rearing in a male-
female model, discouraging marriages solely for tax and other
benefits, maintaining uniformity with marriage laws in other states,
and historical intolerance for same-sex relationships.'" These also did
not pass muster under the court's analysis. 131
The disagreement between Chief Justice Amestoy and Justice
Dooley is one that has arisen in many states. 132
 Critics of the federal
equal protection approach point to a number of reasons for develop-
ing an independent approach to interpreting equality provisions. For
example, Professor Lawrence Sager has pointed out that the federal
Equal Protection Clause is among the most "underenforced" of fed-
eral constitutional provisions.'" This underenforcement pattern is
due to the deference to states because of concerns for federalism, the
rigid application of the state-action requirement, and the tiered "sus-
pect class/levels of scrutiny" constructs imposed by the United States
Supreme Court."4
 Thus, federal equal protection decisions should
hardly be viewed as limiting the interpretation of state constitutional
equality provisions.
In addition, several years after Professor Sager offered his under-
enforcement thesis, he described another important reason why state
courts should not blindly follow federal constitutional interpreta-
tions.'" Describing the substantial role of "strategic" considerations in
' 29 See In re Ti V., 551 So. 2d al l195.
130 Baker; 744 A.2d at 884-85.
131
 See id. at 885.
132
 See, e,g., Collins, 644 N.E.2d at 72; Due v. Dept. of Soc. Servs, 487 N.W.2d 166 (Mich.
1992); In re Estate of Turner, 391 N.W.2d 767,771-73 (Minn. 1986) (Wahl, J. concurring).
135
 Lawrence G. Sager, Fair Measure: The Legal Status of Underenforced Constitutional
Norms, 91 HARV, L. REV. 1212,1218-20 (1978); see Williams, supra note 67, at 1222.
1/1
 Professor Sager stated:
While there is no litmus test for distinguishing these norms, there are indicia
of underenlbrcement. These include a disparity between the scope of a fed-
eral judicial construct and that of plausible understandings of the constitu-.
tional concept Irom which it -derives, the presence in court opinions of
frankly institutional explanations for setting particular limits to a federal judi-
cial construct, and other anomalies ....
Sager, supra note 133, at 1218-19.
135
 Professor Sager asked, "[Tlo what extent, if any, should state judges faced with
claims under provisions of their state constitutions feel themselves bound to defer to Su-
preme Court interpretations of equivalent federal constitutional provisions?" Lawrence G.
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judicial enforcement of constitutional norms, Professor Sager
identified the possibility of state and federal courts employing differ-
ent strategies in constitutional interpretation: "Like other legal rules,
constitutional rules bear a pragmatic, strategic relationship to the con-
cerns that animate them. Norms of political morality comprise the
targets of constitutional law, but not the necessary or exclusive con-
tent of its rules."'" He noted that strategic concerns account, in part,
for the Supreme Court's limiting equal protection doctrines.'" State
courts, interpreting their own constitutions, may see the need to em-
ploy different strategies, even though they are applying a similar
"norm of political morality"--equality.'" Sager concluded:
State judges confront institutional environments and histo-
ries that vary dramatically from state to state, and that differ,
in any one state, from the homogenized, abstracted, national
vision from which the Supreme Court is forced to operate. It
is natural and appropriate that in fashioning constitutional
rules the state judges' instrumental impulses and judgments
differ.
In light of the substantial strategic element in the compo-
sition of constitutional rules, the sensitivity of strategic con-
cerns to variations in the political and social climate, the dif-
ferences in the regulatory scope of the federal and state
judiciaries, the diversity of state institutions, and the special
familiarity of state judges with the actual working of those in-
stitutions, variations among state and federal constitutional
rules ought to be both expected and welcomed.'"
Chief Justice Amestoy implicitly recognized this potential underen-
forcement of the federal Equal Protection Clause when he discussed
the Vermont Supreme Court's well-known 1982 decision, Stale v. Lud-
low Supermarkets, Inc. , 140 in Baker. Describing Ludlow, he noted:
Sager, Foreword: State Courts and the Strategic Space Between the Norms and Rules of Constitutional
Law, 63 Tt:x. L. REV. 959, 959 (1985); see also Ulmer, supra note 77, at 1580 Mlle gut issue,
though, is how closely the state courts should follow federal precedents in applying their
states' provisions."),
"6 Sager, supra note 135, at 962.
I" Id. at 974.
138 Id. at 967.
1" Id. at 975-76; see also Lawrence G. Sager, Some Observations About Race, Sex, and Equal
Protection, 59 or.. L. Ray. 928, 936-37 (1985).
I" 448 A.2d 791 (Vt. 1982) (invalidating Sunday closing law on equality grou nds).
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After noting that this Court, unlike its federal counterpart,
was not constrained by considerations of federalism and the
impact of its decision on fifty varying jurisdictions, the Court
declared that Article 7 "only allows the statutory
classifications ... if a case of necessity can be established
overriding the prohibition of Article 7 by reference to the
'common benefit, protection, and security of the people.'" 141
It remains to be seen whether Bakerwill resolve the confused state
of Vermont equality juriSprudence. 142
 The court should treat the mat-
ter as resolved by the majority opinion because the Common Benefits
Clause cannot be both an independent, vital clause and a disguised
federal Equal Protection Clause at the same time. Chief Justice Ames-
toy's majority opinion demonstrates clearly that it is independent in
text and history, and therefore should be independent in judicial in-
terpretation.
D. Plaintiffs' Choice of State Forum and State Constitutional
Cause of Action
Choosing the state forum, and relying on state constitutional
claims rather than federal constitutional claims, reflects an important
strategic choice in current civil liberties litigation. 143 Professor Jenni-
fer Friesen observed, earlier in the development of the New Judicial
Federalism:
Without question, the rebirth of reliance on state bills of
rights is one of the most fascinating developments in civil
rights law of the last two decades. . . .
It is no accident that the best-publicized uses of state consti-
tutions have been as defenses to criminal or civil liability or
as grounds for injunctive relief, rather than as grounds for
recovering damages. . . . Injunctive relief under state consti-
tutions is most often sought by plaintiffs bringing class action
111 Baiter, 744 A.2d at 871 (quoting Ludlow, 448 A.2d at 795).
112
 Professors Friedman and Baron provide extensive treatment of this question. See
Friedman & Baron, supra note 2, at 151-53.
113 See generally MICHAEL. E. SOLIMINE & JAMES L. WALKER, RESPECTING STATE COURTS:
THE INEVITABILITY OF JUDICIAL FEDERALISM (1999) (discussing choice of forum and -.par-
ity" between state and federal courts, albeit primarily in the context of state courts enforc-
ing federal rights).
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or public interest litigation, for which privately or publicly
funded counsel may be available.'"
Because Baker was a civil case, the plaintiffs were able to exercise their
choice of a cause of action and forum." 5 Chief Justice Amestoy's ma-
jority opinion concluded that having resolved the matter under the
Common Benefits Clause, it was unnecessary to address the other
state constitutional claims."6 The Common Benefits Clause therefore
provided an "adequate and independent state ground" that the
United States Supreme Court could not review.147 The insulation of
state constitutional interpretations from the United States Supreme
Court review is a central feature of the New Judicial Federalism)"
The unlikely chances of prevailing on a federal claim undoubt-
edly influenced the plaintiffs' choice of forum and state constitutional
claims in Baker. The plaintiffs' decision to employ the state forum,
however, can also be attributed to Vermont's responsiveness to state
144 Jennifer Friesen, Recm,ering Damages for State Bills of Rights Claims, 63 TEx. L. REv.
1269, 1269-70 (1985); see also 1 FRIESEN, supra note 91, at 7-1 to 7-42. Baker was filed by
three SIIIIIC-Sex couples, not as a class action, and sought only the declaratory and injunc-
tive remedy of an order requiring marriage licenses to be issued. See Baker, 744 A.2d at
867-68, 886; Brief for Appellant at 2, Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (No. 98-032).
145 See Baker, 744 A.2d at 870 n.2.
146 Id. The plaintiffs, had also wisely, although unsuccessfully. added a slate statutory
ch ' under the Vermont marriage statute. Id. at 868-69. Brief for Appellants at 6-16,
Baker v. Slate, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (No. 9g-032); Brief for Appellees, at 5-28, Baker v.
Slate, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt. 1999) (No. 98-032); see also Mac Knykonlall, Resistance to Same-Sex
Marriage as a Story About Language: Linguistic Failure and the Priority of a Living Language, 34
lIARS'. C.R.-C.L. L. REv. 385, 400-01 (1999) (discussing statutory interpretation argu-
ments). Plaintiffs in Baker therelbre avoided the mistake often made by constitutional liti-
gators—ignoring subconsdintional statutory or common-law claims. As ,Insure Hans A.
Linde has noted:
Eager legal aid lawyers once can't!. to our court trying to fit a woman's
right. to operate a day care center within the due process analysis of Goklberg ii.
Kelly. Only after the argument did our own examination show that she was en-
titled to prevail under the state administrative procedure act, which counsel
appall:July had not read.
Justice flans A. Linde, First Things First Rediscovering the Stales' Bills of Rights, 9 U. BALT. L.
REv. 379, 390 (1980); see also Judith S. Kaye, Foreword: The Common Law and State Constitu-
tional Law as Full Partners in the Protection of Individual Rights, 23 RuTGERs L.J. 727 (1992).
147 Michigan v. Long, 463 U.S. 1032, 1041-42 (1983) (explaining the principle that the
Supreme Court will not review judgments of state courts that rest on adequate and inde-
pendent state grounds). See generally Stewart G. Pollock, Adequate and Independent State
Grounds as a Means of Balancing the Relationship Between Slate and Federal Courts, 63 TEx. L.
Rix. 977 (1985); Eric B. Schnu•er, The Inadequate and Dependent "Adequate and Independent
Slate Grounds" Doan' ne, 18 IlAsuNc.s CONST. L.Q. 371 (1991).
SeeJewelt, 500 A.2d at 235; see also supra notes 14-23 and accompanying text.
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constitutional claims. 149
 For example, in 1982 the Vermont Supreme
Court boldly declared:
[0] ur constitution is not a mere reflection of the federal
charter. Historically and textually, it differs from the United
States Constitution. It predates the federal counterpart, as it
extends back to Vermont's days as an independent republic.
It is an independent authority, and Vermont's fundamental
law 150
The state of Vermont has been a leader in the development of the
New Judicial Federalism, 151
 with a state bar that is more conscious of
state constitutional law than many other states. 152 By the time the
Baker litigation was filed, the State of Vermont possessed a legal cul-
ture amenable to, if not actually encouraging of, such claims being
asserted in state court under the state constitution.
E. State Constitutional Borrowing and Horizontal Federalism
As noted earlier, Chief Justice Amestoy placed substantial reli-
ance on the fact that Vermont's Common Benefits Clause "was bor-
rowed verbatim from the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776, which
was based, in turn, upon a similar provision in the Virginia Declara-
149
 See generally supra notes 14-23 and accompanying text; see also infra note 152.
150
 State v. Badger, 450 A.2d 336,347 (Vt. 1982).
151 See text accompanying supra notes 15-20.
152 The Vermont Supreme Court adopted a dual analysis approach in Badger. The
Badger court first analyzed the federal Constitution's treatment of evidence seized and a
confession made after interrogation but prior to a Miranda warning. Badger, 450 A.2d at
341. The court went on to consider the saute issues under the Vermont Constitution, ob-
serving that:
Our first concern is enmity between this Court and the United States Su-
preme Court. We stand on a different footing when we evaluate federal con-
stitutional claims. On federal issues, we are no more than an intermediate
court, attempting to apply the "supreme law of the land," as pronounced by
the United States Supreme Court.... Yet, if our ruling is based upon an ade-
quate and independent state ground, federal review is limited to a determina-
tion of whether Vermont law violates some provision of federal law.
Id. at 346 (interim] citations omitted).
A survey of over 500 decisions, from all 50 states, between the time of the Michigan v.
Long decision and the beginning of 1988, concluded that "few states have adopted a con-
sistent, concise way of com iiiii ideating the bases for their constitutional decisions." Felicia
A. Rosenfield, Fulfilling the Goals of Michigan v. Long: The Slate Court Reaction, 56 FoRDHAm
L. RE v. 1041,1068 (1988).
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don of Rights of 1776." 1 " This process of state constitutional borrow-
ing, which began with the first state constitutions, continues today.'"
Alternatively, state courts look for guidance from other state
courts interpreting similar or identical state constitutional provisions,
rather than looking vertically to United States Supreme Court deci-
sions interpreting federal constitutional provkions. 155 Labeled "hori-
zontal federalism" by G. Alan Tarr and M.C. Porter,156 this was one of
the techniques suggested by Justice Hayes in the State u Jewett opin-
ion. 157 In Baker, Chief Justice Amestoy surveyed other states' interpre-
tations of common benefits clauses and similar provisions in a long
footnote. 158 He concluded, however, that such decisions were "scarce"
and not very instructive.l 5"
F. Remedy
Chief Justice Amestoy's majority opinion crafted a remedy that
deferred to the legislature the question whether to authorize formal
marriage for same-sex couples or, rather, to enact "a parallel 'domes-
tic partnership' system or some equivalent statutory alternative."'" He
noted that the court did not "purport to infringe upon the preroga-
tives of the Legislature to craft an appropriate means of addressing
this constitutional mandate." 61 In effect, the court "remanded" the
case to the legislative branch, with instructions to act. 162 Chief Justice
Amestoy acknowledged that it was possible that some future case
might allege that denial of a marriage license based on the domestic
partnership alternative was a per se violation of the Common Benefits
Clause, but that was not the claim addressed in Baker,I 63 Finally, the
court suspended its judgment to give the legislature a reasonable pe-
155 Baker, 744 A.2(lat 875; see also supra notes 40-56 and accompanying text.
TARR, supra NOW 75, at 50-51, 98.
155 STATE SumuNE Comm xxi—xxii (M.C. Porter & G. Alan Tarr eds., 1982).
156 Id.
157 Seeleurtt, 500 A.2d at 237; see also Banning, 641 A.2d at 759.
155 See Baker, 744 A.2d at. 87711.9.
ISO See id.
155 Id. at 867; see also id. at. 886. Professor Robert Schapiro has examined jndicial defer-
core in an exhaustive study in Robert A. Schapiro, Judicial Deference and Interpretative Coor-
dinacy in State and Federal Constitutional Law, 85 CORNELL. L. KEN -. 656 (2000).
161 Baker, 744 A.2d al 886.
152 See id.
165 See id.; see generally Barbara J. Cox, But Why Not Marriage: An Essay on Vermont's Civil
Unions Law, Same-Sex Marriage, and Separate but (Un)equal, 25 VT. L. REV. 113 (2000); Mark
Strasser, Mission Impossible: On Baker, Equal Benefits, and the Imposition of Stigma, 9 1A7m. &
MARY BILL RTS. J. 1 (2000).
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riod of time in which to act, inviting plaintiffs to return if it refused to
act.'"
Almost immediately after the court's decision, the Vermont Legis-
lature took up the Civil Union act. In April 2000, the bill was adopted
and approved by the governor. 165 The Civil Union act reaffirmed the
limitation of civil marriage itself to "a union between a man and a
woman,"166 a victory for opponents of same-sex marriage. The bill,
however, contained extensive legislative findings (and specific refer-
ences to the Baker decision) concerning the unfairness of denying the
benefits and protections of marriage to same-sex couples. 167 The Civil
Union act also provided an exhaustive statutory equalization of the
position of opposite-sex couples in the marriage relationship and
same-sex couples in the civil-union relationship, beginning with the
following provision: "Parties to a civil union shall have all the same
benefits, protections and responsibilities under law, whether they de-
rive from statute, administrative or court rule, policy, common law or
any other source of civil law, as are granted to spouses in a mar-
riage. "168
Justice Denise Johnson dissented from the remedy portion of the
Baker decision, concluding that it "abdicates this Court's constitu-
tional duty to redress violations of constitutional rights." 69 She would
have preferred an injunctive remedy forbidding the denial of mar-
riage licenses.m Chief Justice Amestoy had devoted a significant por-
tion of his opinion to refuting this claim, asserting that it was "predi-
cated upon a fundamental misinterpretation of our opinion." 171
The remedial approach taken by the court flowed rather natu-
rally from the legal theory applied by both Chief Justice Amestoy and
Justice Dooley. Both opinions addressed the claim as seeking, in Chief
Justice Amestoy's words, "the secular benefits and protections of a
singularly human relationship," rather than, specifically, marriage
' 64 See Baker, 744 A.2d at 887.
165
 Ch. 91, Vermont Laws of 1999-2000 (approved April 26, 2000) (codified VT. STAT.
ANN. tit. 15, ch. 23, history-§ 1212 (1989 & 2001 Stipp.)).
" VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, ch. '23, history (1) (1989 & 2001 Supp.)).
167
 See id. at (4)—( II).
1" See id. at § 1204 (a)—(f) .
169 Balm; 744 A.2d at 898 ( Johnson, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part).
170 Id. For support of her position, see generally Cox, supra note 163; William N. Esk-
ridge, Jr., Equality Practice' Liberal Reflections on the Jurisprudence of Civil Unions, 64 Al.B. L
1W'. 853 (2001); Mae Kuykendall, Gay Marriages and Civil Unions: Democracy, The Judiciary
and Discursive Space in the Liberal Society, 52 MERCER L Rev. 1003 (2001); Strasser, supra note
163.
171 Baker, 744 A.2d at 887.
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censes. 172 Chief Justice Amestoy acknowledged that the plaintiffs'
complaint was "designed to secure a marriage license," but noted that
their "arguments here have focused primarily upon the consequences
of official exclusion from the statutory benefits, protections and secu-
rity incident to marriage under Vermont law." 173 Characterizing the
claim in this way supported the alternative "legislative remand" rem-
edy crafted in Bahen 174 These calculations in framing a remedy for a
constitutional violation seem to reflect, in Professor Sager's terms,
significant "strategic elements" at work in the court's decisionmakimig
process."5
The Vermont court's remedial approach to the marriage of same-
sex couples/legislative remand issue differed in a very important way
from that adopted earlier by the Hawaii Supreme Court. That court,
in Baehr v. Lewin, 176 rejected a state constitutional privacy claim to the
right to marriage of same-sex couples,I 77 but held that under state
equal protection analysis the state would have to show a compelling
interest to justify denying them marriage licenses. 178 It is not clear
whether the court considered a civil union remedy. Before the case
could make it back to the Hawaii Supreme Court after remand and an
extensive trial on the compelling state interest question, the people of
Hawaii approved a 1998 amendment, to the state constitution provid-
ing: "The legislature shall have the power to reserve marriage to op-
posite-sex couples."'" In December 1999, about a week before the
Vermont Baker decision, the Hawaii Supreme Court recognized that
any state constitutional basis for ordering access to marriage for same-
sex couples had been eliminated. 180
Chief Justice Amestoy acknowledged the "instructive" events in
Hawaii, including the state constitutional amendment overruling the
Hawaii Supreme Court's decision, as well as a similar amendment in
Alaska. 181 It seems likely that this information played a significant role
"2 Id, at 889.
173 Id, at 886.
174 See id. at 888.
175 See supra notes 135-139 and accompanying text.
170 852 P.2d 44 (Flaw. 1993), reconsideration and clarification printed in part, 875 I'.2d 225
(Flaw. 1993), reversed and remanded sub nom, Baehr v. Miikc, 994 I'.2d 566 (Flaw. 1999)
(them.) (after constitutional amendment overruling earlier decision).
"7 See id. at 55-57.
178 See id. at 59-68.
179
	 CONST. art. 1, § 23.
No See Baehr v. Miikc, 994 P.2d 566,566 (Flaw. 1999) (them.).
181 See Baker-, 744 A.2d at 888. Alaska Constitution, article I, section 25 reversed an
Alaskan trial court decision that held, on state constitutional privacy and equal protection
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in the decision to provide an alternative remedy, deferring to the leg-
islature. 182 Justice Johnson had stated that her preferred remedy—
mandating issuance of marriage licenses to same-sex couples—would
avoid the "political caldron" of a remand to the legislature.'" Chief
Justice Amestoy, referring explicitly to the Hawaii and Alaska amend-
ments, described Justice Johnson's view as "significantly insulated
from reality."18'1
 In fact, an unsuccessful move to amend the Vermont
constitution did follow the Baker decision."5
Chief Justice Amestoy acknowledged the fact that state constitu-
tions present somewhat of a paradox when guaranteeing rights, be-
cause judicial rights interpretation can be overturned by a mere ma-
jority vote through state constitutional amendment.'" Dr. Douglas
Reed has called this element of state constitutional law (which he dis-
tinguishes from federal constitutional law) "popular constitutional-
ism," concluding that "[t]he interpreter of state constitutions, under
popular constitutionalism, is less likely to be a judge and more likely
to be a mobilized and politically active citizenry." 187
 In fact, the events
in Vermont seem to bear out his description of effective "legal mobili-
zatim1":
A key test of popular constitutionalism's capacity to resolve
the claims of gays and lesbians lies in the political majority's
ability to reconstruct the language of a constitutional right to
equal marriage as a negotiable interest that can be traded
grounds, that unless the state could demonstrate a compelling interest, same-sex couples
were entitled to obtain marriage licenses. See ALASKA. CONST. art. I, § 25 (stating "a mar-
riage may exist only between one man and one woman"); Brouse v. Bureau of Vital Statis-
tics, No. 3AN-95-6562 CI, slip op. at 1 (Alaska Super. Ct., 3d Dist., Feb. 27, 1998).
182 See Reed, supra note 8, at 871 ("[I]t is clear that the Vermont Supreme Court
learned from Hawaii's example, noting that a decision which mandated same-sex marriage
outright might face intense opposition."). The State of Vermont had pointed out the Ha-
waii amendment in its brief. Brief for Appellee at 92, Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864 (Vt.
1999) (No. 9S-032).
183 Baker, 744 A.2d at 898.
184 Id.
188 See David Orgon Coolidge & William C. Duncan, Beyond Baker: the Case for a Vermont
Marriage Amendment, 25 VT. L. REv. 61,80 (2000); Gil Kujovich, In Opposition to Amending
the liymont Constitution, 25 VT. L. REV. 277, 283 (2000). For au assessment of federal consti-
tutional challenges to such an amendment, see Mark Strasser, Same-Sex Marriage Referenda
and the Constitution: On Hunter, Romer and Electoral Process Guarantees, 64 ALB. L. REv. 949,
975-79 (2001).
188 See Baker, 744 A.2d at 888. See generalt5, Harry L. Witte, Rights, Revolution, and the
Paradox of Constitutionalism: The Processes of Constitutional Change in Pennsylvania, 3 WIDENER
J. Puts. L 383,384 (1993).
187 Reed, supra note 8, at 875.
20011	 State Constitutions and Marriages of Same-Sex Couples 	 103
within a framework of majoritarian policy-making. The po-
litical trajectory of the struggle indicates that this has already
happened. 188
The compromise Civil Union act passed by the Vermont Legislature
represents the translation of judicially-determined rights into an "in-
terest" subject to negotiation and compromise. 189 The court's decision
clearly facilitated this outcome. 190 ,
Of course, some critics would not characterize the court's ruling
as deferential in any way toward the legislature. 191 After all, the Ver-
mont legislature had not, prior to the court's decision, chosen to pro-
vide for either marriage of same-sex couples or for civil union status.
Professor Bill Eskridge characterized the Baker court as a "norm en-
trepreneur,"192 which, by the use of a "savvy ... aggressive trial bal-
loon" forced the issue of marriage of same-sex couples onto the legis-
lative agenda. 193 The legislature responded with its Civil Union
statute, referred to by Professor Eskridge as a "face-saving pseudo-
nym."194
The Baker decision can also he seen as an example of "agenda
setting policymaking" judicial decisionmaking, where the court acts by
"identifying problems for political resolution rather than prescribing
detailed policies of its own."05 It can also be seen as a form of judicial
"affirmative activism." 196 This kind of judicial intervention in social
policy questions, at the invitation of the plaintiffs to be sure, always
raises separation of powers concerns and criticism based on a more
passive model of judicial power. In Baker, Chief Justice Amestoy an-
swered these predictable criticisms. Acknowledging the controversial
nature of the case but asserting that it raised a question that the court
log Id. at 919.
199 See id.
190 See generally Gil Kujovich, An Essay on the PasSive Virtue of Baker v. Slate, 25 VT. L.
REV. 93 (2000).
191 See, e.g., William N. Eskridge, Jr., No Promo Homo: Tire Sedimentation of Antigay Dis-
course and the Channeling Effect of judicial Review, 75 N.Y.U. L. REV. 1327, 1405 (2000);
Kuykendall, supra note 170, at 1031-32.
192 Eskridge, supra note 191, at 1405.
199 See id. at 1404; see also Kuykendall, .supra note 170, at 1031-32.
194
 Eskridge, supra note 191, at 1 349 (citing William N. Eskridge, Jr., Comparative Law
and the Same-Sex Marriage Debate: A Step-by-Step Approach Thward State • Regulation, 31
MCGEORGE L. REV. 641 (2000)).
195 G. Alan Tan. & Russell S. Harrison, legitimacy and Capacity in Stale Supreme Court
Poligmatting: The New jersey Court and. Exclusionaty Zoning, 15 RUTGERS L.J. 513, 566 (1084)
(quoting limit/ um LAME, 'Inc QUEST FOR JUSTICE 200-01 (1978)).
196 Cf. id. at 516.
104	 Boston College Law Review ,
	 [Vol. 43:73
well knew arouses deeply-felt religious, moral, and political beliefs, he
noted: "Our constitutional responsibility to consider the legal merits
of issues properly before us provides no exception for the controver-
sial case." 197
It has been argued that state courts are perhaps less subject to
criticism for "affirmative activism" than federal courts. As one com-
mentator noted: "[t]hese institutional differences between the federal
and state courts suggest that active judicial review of public law issues
at the state level is not as troublesome theoretically as it is at the fed-
eral level."198 Still, cases like Baker certainly stimulate criticisms of the
court's "activism" and raise questions about the legitimacy of such
forms of state constitutional decisionrnaking. 199
H. BAKER AND STATE CONSTITUTIONAL RIGHTS JURISPRUDENCE
Not until about ten, years ago, well into the development of the
New Judicial Federalism, 200
 could one describe the topic of state con-
stitutional rights jurisprudence. For example in 1988, two commenta-
tors pointed out that "most of the literature, like many of the state
cases themselves, offers more in terms of !approval and encourage-
ment than of analytical insight and innovation.... More attention
must be devoted to new conceptualizations in constitutional doc-
trine."201
 Several years later, Dr. G. Alan Tarr noted that "one might
have expected a lively dialogue between constitutional theorists and
state constitutional scholars. However, no ,such dialogue has devel-
oped. Indeed, what is striking is how little attention scholars and ju-
rists have paid to the relationship between constitutional theory and
state constitutional law."202
197
 Baker, 794 A.2d at 867.
198
 Robert B. Keiter, An Essay on Wyoming Constitutional Interpretation, 21 LAND & WATER
L. REV. 527, 535 (1986); see also Tarr & Harrison, supra note 195, at 539-40.
199 See generally DONALD HOROWITZ, THE. COUR'T'S AND SOCIAL POLICY (1977); Tarr &
Harrison, .supra note 195, at 542-47.
2°° See supra notes 10-12 and accompanying text.
2°1
 Ronald K.L. Collins & David M. Skovet, The Futiire of Liberal Legal Scholarship, 87
Micit. L. REV. 189, 217-18 (1988). There were, in fact, several excellent pre-1988 contribu-
tions to state constitutional theory. See, e.g., A.R. Dick Howard, State Courts and Constitu-
tional Rights in the Day of the Burger Court, 62 VA. L. REV. 873 (1976); Keiter, supra note 198,
at 527; David R. Keyser, State Constitutions and Theories offudicial Review: Some Variations on a
Theme, 63 TEx. L. Rev. 1051 (1985); Linde, supra note 92; Hans A. Linde, Without "Due
Process": Unconstitutional Law in Oregon, 49 OR. L. REV. 125:(1970); Symposium, Developments
in the Law—The Interpretation of Stale Constitutional Rights, 95 1-[MW. L. REV. 1324 (1982).
202
 Tarr, supra note 73, at 842. But see Daniel B. Rodriguez, State Constitutionalism and the
Domain of Normative Timmy, 37 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 523, 531 (2000) (questioning whether
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In the 1990s this situation began to change. Matters of constitu-
tional theory began to be brought to bear OIL state constitutional
rights questions. Much of the state constitutional jurisprudence of the
1990s can actually be attributed to a 1992 critique of the New judicial
Federalism.203 Professor James A.i Gardner argued that "state constitu-
tional law today is a vast wasteland of confusing, conflicting, and es-
sentially unintelligible pronouncements" 204 and that "state constitu-
tional discourse is impoverished and inadequate to the tasks that any
constitutional discourse is designed to accomplish."205 He criticized
state constitutional decisions for not utilizing a "'discourse of distinct-
ness' . . . a language and set of conventions enabling participants in
the legal system to argue that provisions in the state constitution mean
something different from their federalcountetparts. "206
After having concluded that state constitutional discourse was
impoverished, Professor Gardner asserted that this is caused by the
failure of state constitutionalism generally.207 He pointed to the inclu-
sion of mere statutory detail in state constitutions (which reflect po-
litical compromise), and the frequency with which constitutions are
amended or revised to conclude that state constitutionalism was a
failed enterprise.208 According to Professor Gardner, the "poverty of
state constitutional discourse merely reflects the limited narrative pos-
sibilities that state constitutions ,offer to erstwhile interpreters."209 A
truly diverse set of independent constitutional values, at least in rights
cases, was even said to be dangerous to the national comnitulity. 210
Ultimately, Professor Gardner contended that "the communities in
theory defined by state constitutions simply do not exist, and debating
the meaning of a state constitution does not involve defining an iden-
tity that any group would recognize as its own." 211 A true constitution,
according to his view, would do Much more: "The content of a consti-
the focus on the "high iawcraft" in constitutional adjudication is as important in state con ,
stitutional law as:in federal constitutional law).
203 See grnerally Gardner, sepia note 20. ,
204 Id. at 763.
tog
	 at 766.
206 Id. at 778. (emphasis added); see also id, at 804 NA] discourse of distinctiveness [is)
. a way of explaining differences between the state and federal constitutions.").
207 See.kl. at 812 (noting "the failure of state constitutionalism itself to provide a work-
able model for the contemporary practice, of constitutional law and discourse on the state
level").
"8 See Gardner, supra note 20, at 818-22.
2°9 Id. at 822.	 •
219 Id, at 827.
211 Id. at
 837.
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tution can thus reflect some of the most essential and intimate aspects
of the character of the people who adopted it, a feature that courts
occasionally can exploit in order to assist them in construing the con-
stitution in difficult cases." 212
Professor Gardner's strong and provocative conclusions have
stimulated useful disaissions of what state constitutional law is
about. 215 Much of that discussion continues to analyze state constitu-
tional law as it relates to federal constitutional law, in comparative or
relational terms, or, in Professor Gardner's terms, debating the merits
of a "discourse of distinctness." 214 The Baker v. State decision provides
an excellent vehicle for analyzing GardnerIs critique as well as com-
peting jurisprudential views of state constitutional law.215
A. Critiques , of the "Discourse of Distinctiveness"
One critic of Professor Gardner, Professor Paul Kahn, argued
that state constitutional rights cases should not necessarily "rely on
unique state sources of law. Those sources include the text of the state
constitution, the history of its adoption and application, and the
unique, historically identifiable qualities of the state community." 216
Kahn described constitutionalism, including state constitutional law,
as not a "single set of truths" but rather as an ongoing national dis-
course about "ideas of liberty, equality, and due process." 217 Professor
Kahn illustrated his point using the doctrine, of equality:
212
 Id. at 815-16; see niso James A. Gardner, Southern Character; Confederate Nationalism,
and the Interpretation of Stale Constitutions: A Case Study iu Constitutional Argument, 76 TEX. L.
REV. 1219,1221-22 (1998).
213 Professor Gardner's article has generated'a wide response. See, e.g., Neil IL Cogan,
In Praise of Diverse Discourse, 5 ST. "FE10154AS L. REV. 173 (1992); Jeffrey A. Parness, Failed or
Uneven Discourse of State Constitutionalism?: Governmental Structure and State Constitutions, 5
Sr. THOMAS L. REV. 155 (1992); David Schuman, A Failed Critique of State Constitutionalism,
91 !Arm 1. REV. 274 (1992); Robert F. Utter, The Practice of Principled Decision-Making in
State Constitutionalism: Washington's Experience, 65 TEMP. L. REV. 1153 (1992); Roundtable,
Responses to James A. Gardner; The Failed Discourse of State Constitutionalism, 90 Mich. L. Hen
(1992), 24 RUTGERS L.J. 927 (1993). Professor Gardner replied in What Is a State Constitu-
tion?, 24 RumEas L.J. 1025 (1993) [hereinafter Gardner, What Is?]; see also James A.
Gardner, Discourse and Difference—A Reidy to Parness and Cogan, 5 ST. Thomas L. REV. 193
(1992); Ronald L. Nelson, Welcoine to the "Last Frontier," PrOfessor Gardner: Alaska's Independent
Approach to State Constitutional Interpretation, 12 ALASKA L. REV. I (1995).
214 See Gardner, supra note 20, at 778.
215 744 A.2d 8114 (Vt. 1999).
216 Paul W. Kahn, Interpretation and Authority in State Constitutionalism, 106 Ilmtv, L. REV.
1147,1147 (1093).
217 See id. at 1147-48.
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The object of interpretation might, for example, be the
meaning of the constitutional value of equality. Equality does
not have a single, definite meaning in any community prior
to the process of interpretation. It is not a thing waiting to
be discovered by a judge. It only has an identifiable shape af-
ter the judge articulates the conclusion of an interpretive in-
quiry. Even that conclusion is only a momentary stopping
point in an ongoing debate. 2 1 3
Thus, Professor Kahn argued that state courts and federal courts
should work together, using both state constitutions and the federal
Constitution to pursue the "common enterprise" of providing inter-
pretive answers to great constitutional questions. 219 He seemed to re-
ject the necessity of Professor Gardner's "discourse of distinctness. "220
Professor Kahn used a landthark state constitutional decision to
support his thesis. 221
 He referred to Kentucky v. Wasson,222 a case in
which the Kentucky Supreme Court rejected the United States Su-
preme Court's decision in Bowers v. Hardwick223 and struck down Ken-
tucky's sodomy laws. The Baker decision seems equally illustrative of a
state court's contribution, interpreting its own state constitution, to
218 Id. at 1161.
219 Id. at 1168.
22° See Gardner, .supht note 20, at 778.
221 See Kahn, salvo note 216, at 1153.
222 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992). Interestingly, the Kentucky state constitutional provision
at issue in Wasson was also borrowed from the Pennsylvania Constitution of 1776. Id, at 492
(citing Ken Gormley & Rhonda G. Hartman, The Kentucky Bill of Rights; A Bicentennial Cele-
bration, 80 Ky. Lj. 1 (1990-91)). Wasson is commented on in Recent Case, State Constitu-
tions—Homosexual Sodomy—Kentucky Supreme Court Finds that Criminalization of Homosexual
Sodomy Violates State Constitutional Guarantees of Privacy and Equal Protection—Commonwealth
v. Wasson, 842 S.W.2d 487 (Ky. 1992), 106 1 14Anv. L. Ray. 13711 (1903); see also Thotims 1'.
Lewis, Special Feature, Commonwealth v. Wasson; Invalidating Kentucky's Sodomy Statute, 81
KY. L. Ray. 423 (1992-93). See generally Susan Ayres, Coming Out: Decision-Making in Slate
and Federal Sodomy Cases, 62 Aut. L. Ray 355 (1908); Larry Caul Backer, Narrative and Juris-
prudence in Slate Courts,- The Example of CanStitu firma' Challenges to Sex Conduct Regulation, 60
Ars. L. Ray. 1633 (1997); Paula A. Branmer, Removing Bricks From the Will of Discrimination:
State Constitution& Changes to Sodomy Laws, 19 HASTINGS CONST. L.Q. 405 (1992); Nan Fey-
let; The Use of the State Constitutional Right to Privacy to Defeat State Sodomy Laws, 14 N.Y.U.
Rev. L. & Soc. CHANGE 973 (1986); Michael James Confusicine, Note, Sexual Conduct, Sex-
ual Orientation, and State Constitutional Law,.'25 RUTGERS L.J. 1004 (1994); Developments in the
Law—Sexual Orientation-and the Law, 102 Ilium L. Rev. 1508, 1534-36 (1089).
Montana reached a conclusion similar to Kentucky's in Gryczan v. State, 942 P.2d 112,
122 (Mont. 1997) (explicit privacy provision). In 1998, the Georgia Supreme Court de-
clared Georgia's sodomy law unconstitutional in a heterosexual context. See Powell v. State,
510 S.E.2d 18 (Ga. 1908).
223
 478 U.S. 186 (1986).
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the national constitutional dialogue about the meaning of equality in
the context of marriage of same-sex couples. Chief Justice Amestoy
concluded his majority opinion in Baker with the following observa-
tion:
The past provides many instances where the law refused to
see a human being when it should have.... The challenge
for future generations will be to define what is most essen,
tially human. The extension of the Common Benefits Clause
to acknowledge plaintiffs as Vermonters who seek nothing
more, nor less, than legal protection and security for their
avowed commitment to an intimate and lasting human rela-
tionship is simply, when all is said and done, a recognition of
our common humani ty.224
Despite his state-specific. reference to "Vermonters," it seems clear that
Chief Justice Amestoy was referring to the "common enterprise" of a
universal, generalizable, human-rights question that transcends the
State of Vermont, and even the United States, to encompass the entire
world. It was to state-specific Vermont legal sources, however, both
textual and historical, that he turned to formulate an answer to the
universal question. 225
Chief Justice Amestoy's references to Vermonters and to the
Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont state constitution do suggest
a state-specific inquiry, based on unique state sources or a "discourse
of distinctness."226 This textual focus is an important way to distin-
guish the interpretation of a state constitution from the United States
Supreme Court's interpretations of the federal Constitution. 227 This
point was emphasized by Justice Hans Linde of Oregon, one of the
most influential scholars and judges in the rise of New Judicial Feder-
alism, when he cautioned that state constitutions are not "common
law."228 He noted that:
[S] tate courts find themselves pulled between fidelity to the
state's own charter and the sense that constitutional law is a
22 ' 1 Baker, 744 A.2d at 889.
225 See id, at 886-87.
226 See Gardner, supra note 20, at 778.
227 See Tarr, supra note 73, at 847-48.
22 See Flans A. Linde, State Constitutions Are Not Common Law: Comments on Gardner's
Discourse, 24 RUTGERS 1.J. 927, 956 (1993) {hereinafter Linde, Comments]; Flans A.
Linde, Are State Constitutions Gotham Law?, 34 ARIZ. L. Rev. 215, 226-29 (1992) [hereinaf-
ter Linde, Common Law?].
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shared enterprise. Fidelity to a constitution need not mean
narrow literalism. Most state bills of rights leave adequate
room for modern applications, as well as for comparing simi-
lar guarantees elsewhere. But fidelity to a constitution means
at least to identify what clause is said to invalidate the chal-
lenged law, to read what one interprets, and to explain it in
terms that will apply beyond the case at issue, not to substi-
tute phrases that have no analogue in the state's charter... .
A demand that each state's court reach whatever desired re-
sult courts in other states have reached, in the common law
manner of generic judge-made formulas, denies significance
to the lawmaking act of choosing and adopting the constitu-
tional provisions on which claims of unconstitutionality
rest. 229
Chief Justice Amestoy's focus on the Common Benefits Clause
itself, together with its historic origins, judicial interpretation, and
differences from the federal Equal Protection Clause, illustrates Pro-
fessor Gardner's and Justice Linde's theories just as it reflects Profes-
sor Kahn's.259 In other words, the majority decision in Baker both con-
tributes to the national dialogue about equality and is anchored in
state-specific, relatively unique Vermont constitutional law sources. 231
229 Linde, Common Law?, supra note 228, at 228-29. Some years earlier Justice Linde
had made a similar point:
Courts, of course, are quite accustomed to seeing differences in state laws
without attributing these to different values or beliefs of the state's inhabi-
tants. The values or beliefs that count arc (hose (I tat have been translated into
law, often by people with different views front the present generation's. This is
true of important differences in people's rights under slate statutes and
common law; it also is true of state constitutions.... The presence or absence
of a clause in a constitution—an equal rights amendment, for instance, or a
right of privacy—may or may not be evidence of social values, but it is unmis-
takable evidence of societal action, of the choice whether to enact an idea
into law. To bury such choices tinder a theory of noninterproive adjudication
deprives political action of its constitutional significance.
Linde, supra note 92, at 195.
259 See supra Text accompanying notes 204-212,216-220,228-229.
231 POI differently, using Professor Gardner's terms, the opinion has both positivist and
universalist characteristics. See generally James A. Gardner, The Positivist Revolution That
Wasn't: Constitutional Universalism in the States, 4 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 109 (1998).
Professor Gardner distinguished constitutional universalism: "the belief that all American
constitutions are drawn front the same set of universal principles of justice and good gov-
ernment," from the positivist approach: "looking to the state constitution's text, history
and structure and the underlying values of the state polity that the constitution reflects—
in other words, the kinds of sources that would be relevant under a positivist approach to
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Professor Lawrence Friedman, building on the work of Professor
Kahn and others, has elaborated carefully on the elements and
benefits of a true constitutional dialogue between state courts and the
United States Supreme Court on shared constitutional issues. 232 Pro-
fessor Friedman argued that "insofar as the new judicial federalism
reflects attempts by state courts independently to interpret the mean-
ing of cognate textual provisions, its legitimacy is buoyed by the fed-
eral constitutional value of dialogue—that is, the value that attaches
to discourse about law and governance that occurs between and
among the different organs of the federal and state governments." 233
State constitutional decisions on provisions similar to federal constitu-
tional rights guarantees would provide "an interpretative counter-
point to the U.S. Supreme Court."234 Professor Friedman took issue
with Professor Gardner:
Recall Gardner's skepticism about the depth of state consti-
tutionalism as a reflection of state, as opposed to national,
values, and his contention that this lack of depth militates
against independent interpretation. Because the value of
dialogue reflects a federal constitutional concern, its vindica-
tion vis-a-vis state constitutionalism does not necessarily de-
pend upon differences in the fundamental character and
values of the people of the states. In other words, assuming
Gardner is correct that state constitutions may reflect varia-
tions of a national identity, a state court still would not be
disabled or precluded from contributing to the larger proj-
ect of interpreting shared constitutional text, for the dialogic
n other words, the kinds of sources that would be relevant under a positivist approach to
constitutional adjudication." Id. at 110,128 (footnote omitted).
Professor Lawrence Friedman concludes that the national contribution will be blunted
by reliance on unique slate sources. See Lawrence Friedman, The Constitutional Value of Dia-
logue and the New Judicial Federalism, 28 HAST. CoNsT. L. Q. 93,143-44 (2000).
232 See Friedman, supra note 231, at 112-23.
213 Id. at 97.
25t
	 at 129. Prokssor Friedman elaborated:
Tin: exchange encourages the evolutionary development of constitutional in-
terpretation on the part of each of the participants, to a greater extent in the
state court. But this need not be the case: no jurisprudential rule requires the
U.S. Supreme Court to ignore state court interpretations of cognate provi-
sions as respectable authority, and the Supreme Court has on occasion relied
upon state constitutional decisions for guidance in chanicterizing federal
constitutional obligations.
Id. at 127-28.
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approach (to paraphrase Jennifer Friesen) encourages state
courts to make good constitutional law, using accepted consti-
tutional argument; it does not mandate that state courts
make unique constitutional law. 235
Thus, Professor Friedman agreed with Professor Kahn and took
issue with Profess& Gardner, over the need for unique state constitu-
tional sources as an underpinning for independent, legitimate state
constitutional law. 236 Like Professor Gardner, though, he called for
dialogue, but not a dialogue of "distinctiveness."237 Although the Ver-
mont Baker decision does not necessarily fit Professor Friedman's
mode1,238 because it was based on the Common Benefits Clause, which
has no federal cognate,239 it seems clear that Baker contributes to Pro-
fessor Friedman's national dialogue model.
The concurrent state and federal responsibility for constitutional
decisionmaking, albeit under different constitutions, is a manifesta-
don of American constitutional federalism's "jurisdictional redun-
cy"240—dan	 a term coined by the late Professor Robert Cover by anal-
ogy to the use of redundant systems to protect against technological
malfunction and ensure reliability. 241 Redundancy in constitutional
interpretation can be, in Profess& Cover's terms, either confirmatory,
where all authorities are in agreement, or nonconfirinatory, where
authorities are in conffict. 242 Put , into state constitutional terms, state
courts can either adopt (agree with) or reject (disagree with) earlier
federal constitutional analysis. 243
Professor Cover identified this redundancy in federal and state
jurisdiction as providing a variety of positive influences. 244 Given the
dual goals of courts both to resolve disputes and articulate norms,
federal courts may balance these goals differently in interpreting the
federal Constitution from the way some state courts balance them in
2" Id. at 137 (internal citation omitted).
259 Sre id. at 138.
2" See Friedman, supra note 231, at 138; see also Gardner, supra note 20, at 778.
238 See Friedman, supra note 231, at 137-43.
259 But see infra note 255 and accompanying text.
240 Robert M. Cover, The Uses of Jurisdictional Redundancy: Interest, Marko and Innova-
tion, 22 Wm. & MARY L. REv. 639,649 (1981).
241
 See id.
242 See id. at 674-75,
243 See id. at. 679-80; see also supra notes 155-159.
244 See Cover, supra note '240, at 642. But see generally Earl M. Maltz, The Dark Side of State
Court Activism, 63 Tnx. L. REV. 995 (1085).
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interpreting state ,constitutions. 245 Professor Cover noted that "the ju-
risdictional structure frequently permits recourse to the courts of an-
other system after one system has adjudicated and reached a result.
This diachronic or sequential redundancy is comparatively com-
mon."246 He identified three areas in which this federal-state jurisdic-
tional redundancy would provide a beneficial influence: interest, 247
ideology,248 and innovation. 249
Clearly, state judges such as those on the Vermont Supreme
Court might, and seemingly did in Baker, have a world-view (interest),
construction of reality (ideology), and view of the issue of marriage of
same-sex couples (innovation) that differed substantially from the
predicted views of members of the United States Supreme Court. 25°
Although there has not yet been a definitive decision by that Court on
marriage of same-sex couples, the Baker case illustrates nicely Cover's
concept of jurisdictional redundancy with the Vermont Supreme
Court's norm articulation most likely representing a different, "non-
confirmatory" result from that expected from the United States Su-
preme Court.251
Professor Louis Bilionis pointed out another difference between
state and federal constitutional interpretation: "(T)he constitutionally
significant facts may be different at the state and federal levels. . . . In-
deed, whenever a constitutional methodology admits a need to ac-
commodate institutional considerations, the possibility for different
yet equally correct state and federal results exists." 252 A state court's
view of "constitutionally significant facts" in equality analysis could
certainly differ from the United States Supreme Court's view,' thus
yielding a different outcome. This seems clearly to have been the case
215 Cover, supra note 240, at 643-44.
2416 Id, at 648.
247 Id, at 657, 660-61 (applying to "the judge ... who simply shares a world-view with
t he dominant elite").
218 Id, at 657, 664 (influencing the "decisionmaker's construction of reality was dis-
torted by the social determinants of his mental world").
2.19 Id. at 657, 673 (interpreting Justice Holmes to argue that Innovation in norm ar-
ticulation is healthier in a federal system").
250 (f. Cover, supra note 240, at 657.
551 Cf id. at 674-75.
252 Louis D. Bilionis, On the Significance of Constitutional spirit, 70 N.C. L. REV. 1803,
1808-09 (1992). Professor Biliottis used the reasonable expectation of privacy in search
and seizure cases to illustrate differing views of "constitutionally significant facts." See id. at
1809.
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in Baiter, and relates to Professor Sager's point about strategic con-
cerns.255
Professor Thomas Morawetz has analyzed state constitutional
rights decisions and concluded that they either represent an exercise
of state deviation from federal constitutional principles, or rather,
represent a state judicial exercise, of autonomy, without specific refer-
ence to related federal constitutional norms. 254 He explained:
In understanding the role of judges who must interpret
provisions of state constitutions that are identical or very
similar to provisions of the federal Constitution, one must
distinguish questions of power and authority from questions
of interpretive responsibility. Questions of power and author-
ity are answered by the doctrines of federal supremacy and
federalism. Accordingly, federal law establishes a minimal
national standard for the exercise of individual rights and
state judges, under state constitutions, may recognize higher
levels of protection for such rights.
But the logic of interpretive responsibility commits judges
to offering the best justification they can devise for the rights
at issue. That justification may not simply describe a higher
level of protection but may involve a different way of conceiv-
ing the right, using factors that may or may not be idiosyn-
cratic to the state context. The logical implications of that
way of conceiving the right may create conceptual tension
with the way in which federal courts have conceived the
right. Of course, if the scope of the former conception is
narrower than the scope of the latter, its practical implica-
tions are nil.
Thus, from the standpoint of power and authority, it is ap-
propriate to .see state courts as needing to justify deviation
from the federal norm, to justify expanding a right. But from
the standpoint of interpretive responsibility, state courts are
necessarily autonomous, committed by the very nature of the
judicial task to offering a compelling account of the rights in
" See supra text accompanying notes 135-139.
254 See Thomas Morawetz, Deviation and Autonomy: The Jurisprudence of Interpretation in
State Constitutional Law, 26 CONN. L. REV. 635,657 (1994). This is related to, but with less
emphasis on, the relation between federal and state constitutional decision, Cover's
"confirmatory and nonconlirmatory" categories. See Cover, supra note 240, at 679-75.
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question, an account that may or may not dovetail with the
federal understanding. 255
Professor Morawetz's view seems to contrast with Professor
Gardner's, whose "discourse of distinctness" thesis was based on
justifications for deviation involving issues of power and authority, 256
rather than on autonomy based on "interpretive responsibility."257
Professor Morawetz's emphasis on interpretative responsibility is more
consistent with Justice Linde's view,258 albeit with less emphasis on
specific text, as well as with Professor Kahn's view.259
Although Professor Morawetz indicated that sometimes it is
difficult to distinguish an opinion relying on the deviation approach
from an opinion relying on the autonomy approach, 26° the Baker deci-
sion presents a clear example of an autonomy opinion. Baker sets out
specifically to interpret the Common Benefits Clause of the Vermont
constitution and does not labor excessively to justify deviation from
the likely federal constitutional answer to the claim. 261 It does, how-
ever, justify a different equality doctrine, and judicial approach, from
that contained in federal Equal Protection Clause doctrine. 262 This is
true as well for Justice Dooley's concurring opinion. 263 The Vermont
Supreme Court approached the Baker case as a matter of "interpretive
responsibility" rather than a matter of "power and authority."264
Professor Robert Schapiro has challenged the existing legal theo-
ries about state constitutional rights protection, particularly Professor
Gardner's idea that for truly independent interpretation of a state
constitution there must be "an identifiable state community, an entity
whose inhabitants share distinctive ideals, customs, and traditions." 265
Professor Schapiro argued that it is not the identity of the people of
the state, but rather the ideals defined by the constitution itself that
form the underpinning for a vibrant, independent state constitutional
255 See Morawetz, supra note 254, at 656-57 (internal citation omitted).
256 See supra text accompanying notes 207-212.
257 See Morawetz, supra note 254, at 656.
258 See supra text accompanying notes 228-229.
259 See supra text accompanying notes 216-220.
26° See Morawetz, supra note 254, at 639.
26 ' See Baker, 744 A.2d at 878.
262 See id. at 877-79.
263
 See id. at 890-91.
261 See Morawetz, supra note 254, at 656-57.
205 Robert A. Schapiro, Identity and Interpretation in State Constitutional Law, 84 Va. L.
Ray. '389,391 (1998) (footnote omitted).
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discourse. 266 He contended that what is at issue is really a debate over
judicial review itself, and that Professor Gardner's requirement of a
demonstrated state community served as a condition precedent to the
exercise of independent state constitutional judicial review. 267 He
proposed, as an alternative, the form of "ethical" argument proposed
by Philip Bobbitt. 268 Professor Schapiro concluded:
The text and structure of the Constitution provide the mate-
rials for deriving ethical arguments. The ethical modality
does not understand constitutional interpretation as an ex-
ercise in deriving fundamental values directly from an ex-
amination of a community. Rather, by studying the text and
structure of the Constitution, one comes to understand the
deeply held beliefs that the polity has enshrined in its fun-
damental charter. For our purposes, Bobbites key insight is
that fundamental values may be derived from the structure
and relationships embodied in the Constitution. The people
speak and their underlying commitments give meaning to
their brief and suggestive words; however, judges do not seek
to divine these commitments directly, but through the me-
dium of the Constitution. By identifying an ethos through an
examination of the values placed in a constitution, courts
may avoid various supposed obstacles to independent inter-
pretation.269
To illustrate the ethical approach, Professor Schapiro, like Professor
Kahn, examined equality doctrine. 270 The Vermont Baker decision
reflects a judicial inquiry into the "ethos" of the Common Benefits
Clause of the Vermont state constitution rather than any attempt to
access the values of the current Vermont community. 271 Chief Justice
266 See id. at 393.
267 Id. at 393-94.
268 Id. at 441-42 (citing Plitt.11' Boaturr, CONSTITUTIONAL FATE: THEORY 01.-111E CON-
STITUTION 94-95, I 3 7— 5 6 (1982); Puti.re Itionarrr, CONSTITUTIONAL INTERPRETATION 20—
21,137 (1991)). Interestingly, the landmark Vermont Stale V. jaw,' opinion cited Bobbin's
approach with approval. See 500 A.2d 233,237 (Vt. 1985). For discussion oflewett, see supra
notes 14-20 and accompanying text.
269 See Schapiro, supra note 265, at 442-43.
27° See id. at 444 ("Reading the particular constitution and understanding the values
that it expresses might well provide additional information relevant to answering the in-
terpretive inquiry. Equality may have different meanings and its particular expression may
be inlOrmed by other values of constitutional magnitude.").
271 See gran-ally Baker, 744 A.2d at 864 (basing the holding on the Common Benefits
Clause's historical and textual meaning).
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Amestoy examined the "ideological origins" of the clause, which he
found to provide a "useful light upon the inclusionary principle at its
textual core."272 He provided a searching and deep analysis of the
revolutionary "deep-seated domestic antagonisms," 273 concluding that
"[t] he powerful movement for 'social equivalence' unleashed by the
Revolution ultimately found its most complete expression in the first
state constitutions adopted in the early years of the rebellion." 274
Chief Justice Amestoy did not attempt to analyze the "inclusionary"
instincts of the current population or community of Vermont, but
rather relied on the general, American, 220-year-old egalitarian phi-
losophy which, in Professor Schapiro's terms, demonstrates that "by
studying the text and structure of the Constitution, one comes to un-
derstand the deeply held beliefs that the polity has enshrined in its
fundamental charter."276
 From this point of view, Chief Justice Ames-
toy's majority decision in Baker reflects Justice Linde's and Professor
Schapiro's argument that the state constitutional text and its animat-
ing political origins must be the touchstones of state constitutional
interpretation. 276
Dean Daniel Rodriguez has pointed out that now, as a result of
the "devolution revolution," many important questions of public pol-
icy are no longer being decided at the federal level, but are left to the
states. 277
 He asked whether there is "anything theoretically special
about state constitutionalism beyond the availability of state constitu-
tions as a source of rights and liberties?"278 He answered:
While it follows that each state is to be left to its own de-
vices in shaping its own constitutional discourse, it does not
follow that each state ought to fashion its independent, sepa-
rate theory of state constitutionalism. On the contrary, there
are sound reasons for developing a comprehensive—let us
call it "trans-state"—constitutional theory which can help
orient constitutional discourse throughout the United
States. What is called for in the end is a balance: States can
272
 Id. at 875.
275
274
 Id. at 876.
275 Schapiro, supra note 265, at 442.
276 Cf supra text accompanying notes 228-229,266-269.
277 Daniel 11. Rodriguez, Stale Constitutional Theory and Its Prospects, 28 N. Max. L. REV.
271,272-73 (1998).
27° Id. at 273. Dean Rodriguez reminds us that "Intiodern constitutional theory is, in
the main, nationa/constitutional theory." Id.
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develop independent discourse to account for their own, dis-
tinct constitutional traditions; at the same time, states can
build upon a more general, trans-state constitutional dis-
course. After all, states share in common a set of constitu-
tional objectives. 279
Dean Rodriguez was primarily discussing the institutional structure set
forth in state constitutions. 28° Nonetheless, at least in states that have
common benefits or similar clauses, the Vermont Baker decision does
provide the basis for a "trans-state" constitutional theory, particularly
if one remembers that family and personal relationships are, gener-
ally, uniquely within the competence of states to regulate. 281
One of the criticisms of state constitutions, including Professor
Gardner's,282 has been that they contain a wealth of non-fundamental
policy matters that would be better relegated to statutory law. Profes-
sor James Pope made this point in the following way:
At bottom, the problem with state constitutionalism is—as
James Gardner has thoroughly, ruthlessly, and humorously
shown—that state constitutions just. aren't all that constitu-
tional. How can anyone expect judges to develop independ-
ent constitutional jurisprudence on a textual foundation that
changes with every legislative or popular whim, obsesses in
excruciating detail over pecuniary matters, and declares the
law on such fundamentals as golf course tax exemptions and
bingo regulation?2"
Professor Pope, though, went on to contend that there have been, in
fact, a number of very important "vital provisions" that are "of
sufficient constitutional weight to alter the field of state constitutional
interpretation."284 Professor Pope differentiated the constitutional pro-
visions of state constitutions from those that are merely constitutional
279 Id. at 290-91.
280 See generally id. at 288-91.
28I See id. at 30(1 ("Each state in our union ought to be seriously responsible for ad-
dressing systematically and efficiently the needs and demands of its ciiizens."). The late Dr.
Daniel J. Elazar has indicated that the structure of American constitutionalism has almost
always left such matters to the states and 10 state constitutions, rather than to the federal
Constitution. See Elazar, Foreword, supra note 81, at 859; see also ELAZAR, TRADITION, su/na
note 81, at 170.
252 See Gardner, supra note 20, at 761; see also Kahn, St4Pta note 216, ai 115911.52.
2" fames Cray Pope, An Approach to State Constitutional Interpretation, 24 RUTGERS L.J.
985,985 (1993).
291 Id, at 1007.
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because they have been included in the state constitution. 285 He de-
rived this distinction from the 1977 New Jersey case, Vreeland v.
Byrne. 286
 The Vreeland court observed:
Not all constitutional provisions are of equal majesty. Justice
Holmes once referred to the "great ordinances of the Con-
stitution." Within this category would be included the due
process clause, the equal protection clause, the free speech
clause, all or most of the other sections of the Bill of Rights,
as well as certain other provisions. The task of interpreting
most if not all of these "great ordinances" is an evolving and
on-going process....
But there are other articles in the Constitution of a differ-
ent and less exalted quality. Such provisions generally set
forth—rather simply—those details of governmental admini-
stration as are deemed worthy of a place in the organic
document....
Such constitutional provisions as these, and others like
them, important as they doubtless may be, are entirely set
apart from the "great ordinances" mentioned above, and as a
matter of constitutional interpretation should receive en-
tirely different treatment. Where in the one case the under-
lying spirit, intent and purpose of the Article must be sought
and applied as it may have relevance to the problems of the
day, in the other a literal adherence to the words of the
clause is the only way that the expressed will of the people
can be assured fulfillment. 287
Professor Pope proposed a similar distinction, with "vital" state consti-
tutional provisions receiving the Holmesian "great ordinance" ap-
proach. 288
285 See at 988.
286 See id.; see also Vreeland v. Byrne, 370 A.2d 825 (Ni. 1977).
287
 Vreeland, 370 A.2d at 831-32 (internal citation omitted).
288 See Pope, stipm note 283, at 1002-04. Professor Gardner, although conceding that
Professor Pope's analysis had "undeniable appeal," disagreed; concluding, "What makes
something a coustimtion is not its content or its pedigree, but the current attitude of the
people toward it." Gardner, 11'hat Is?, supra note 213, at 1031, 1032; see also'FARR, supra note
75, at 190 ("For one thing, dispensing with lesser' provisions in building a state constitu-
tional jurisprudence is highly qUestionable,.because what a state chooses to include in its
constitution is important evidence of the vision underlying the document. In addition, the
sharp bifurcation of constitutional provisions reintroduces in another context Gardner's
dubious distinction between what is truly constitutional and what is not.")
20011	 State Constitutions and Marriages of Same-Sex Couples 	 119
As examples of truly constitutional provisions, Professor Pope
cited Jacksonian democracy, the populist-progressive movement for
direct democracy, and the guarantees of free public schools. 289 The
Vermont Baker decision focuses on another category of truly constitu-
tional provisions:. equality provisions such as the Common Benefits
Clause. These kinds of provisions in state constitutions reflect vital
constitutional moments. The Vermont Common Benefits Clause cer-
tainly appears to be a rather majestic, vital "great ordinance" of the
state constitution. The Vermont Supreme Court treated it in a !nail-
ner befitting such a constitutional clause, as one of the "flexible pro-
nouncements constantly evolving responsively to the felt needs of the
times."299 In other words, the provision was considered to be constitu-
tional and was inteipreted accordingly. 291
Dr. Douglas Reed has described a new theory of state constitu-
tional meaning that emanates not exclusively from courts, but rather
from an "exchange between popular mobilization and judicial inter-
pretation."292 One form of this he refers to as "legal mobilization
through public interest litigation."293 Dr. Reed has reviewed the so-
called "down and out" scholarship by those who seek to "de-center"
the courts as the exclusive source of constitutional meanings, and ap-
plied those theories to the movement for recognition of marriage of
same-sex couples or civil union.294 As he stated:
Legal mobilization is a political and strategic practice that
seeks to redefine legal rights and to transform the interests
that are claimed or perceived as legal rights. The transforn ►a-
tion occurs both at the level' of individual consciousness and
institutional recognition. Thus, legal mobilization is a regu-
larized political practice that strives to reallocate power
within a regime or political order. It does so by asking rank
and file members to reconceive their grievances as rights
289 See Pope, supra note 283, at 1009.
290 See id. at 987; see also Baker, 744 A.20 at 875-76.
29, See Pope, supra note 283, at 987; see also Baker, 744 A.2d at 874-76.
292 Reed, supra note 8, at 875; see also Rodriguez, supra note 202, at 530 ("Illf the cen-
trality—or, at least the exclusivity—of constitutional adjudication as a method for framing
constitutional discourse is replaced by legislative, administrative, and citizen/grass-roots
action, then the pressure groups who regularly participate in stale consdultional politics
will organize their strategics accordingly.").
293 Reed, supra note 8, at 875.
2'34 Id. at 881; see also Michael Paris, Legal Mobilization and the Politics of liefbrni: Lessons
from School Finance Litigation in Kentucky, 1984-1995,26 LAW & Soc. Nunn. 631 (2001)
(using a similar approach).
120	 Boston College Law Review	 [Vol. 43:79
and then by seeking legal legitimation of that reconceptuali-
zation. From the perspective of down and out legal scholar-
ship, the practice and struggle over the allocation of rights is
effectively a process of constitutional definition. The value of
down and out scholarship is that it enables us to see these
episodes not merely as recurring legal contests, but as fun-
damental fights over the meaning and content of state con-
stitutioital provisions. 295
Under this view, even the federal and state cases that failed to author-
ize marriage of same-sex couples or civil union rights worked to fuel
the legal mobilization through transforming people's consciousness
about their entitlement to rights. 296 This seems to be an accurate ac-
count of what happened in Hawaii (although it was met with another
form of popular constitutionalism) 297 and can certainly account for
the litigation in Vermont.
B. Other Perspectives
Dr. G. Alan Tarr has noted that in contrast to the great question
in federal constitutional law about the legitimacy of judicial review
itself, the central question in state constitutional law has concerned
the legitimacy of state constitutional rulings that diverge from, or "go
beyond," federal constitutional minimum standards. 298 This was also
the focus of Professor Gardner's concern, as well as a central element
of Professor Morawetz's analysis. 299 Dr. Tarr had indicated that consti-
tutional theory had not been brought to bear on state constitutional-
ism and that textualism and originalism had represented the most
295 Reed, supra note 8, at 893-94. Elsewhere Dr. Reed notes that:
The meanings of state constitutions are frequently forged outside judicial
confines because state constitutions give great credence and power to demo-
cratic majorities, which invites political contestation and dispute. This politi-
cal responsiveness of state constitutions, in conjunction with the expansion of
the state judicial agenda under the "new judicial federalism," has made state
constitutional politics an increasingly dynamic and energetic form of political
contestation in recent times.
M. at 885.
296 See, eg., Jones v. Hallahan, 501 S.W.2d 598 (Ky. Ct. App. 1973); Baker v. Nelson, 191
N.W.2d 185 (Minn. 1971); De Santo v. Barnsley, 476 A.2d 952 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1984); Singer
v. Hera, 522 1'.2d 1187 (Wash. Ct. App. 1974).
2'•17 See supra notes 176-180, and accompanying text.
298 See TA RR, SUPra note 75, at 174-75; see also Rodriguez, supra note 202, at 531.
299 See supra notes 202,251 and accompanying text.
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appealing first steps toward an independent state constitutional ap-
proach.50° Recently, he has grown more optimistic, concluding:
Doubts about the viability of state constitutional jurispru-
dence have not prevented its development. . .
This is not to deny the difficulty of the enterprise of state
constitutional interpretation. State constitutions are distinc-
tive documents, and the approach to their interpretation
must take account of that distinctiveness. Contemporary
constitutional theory can assist in the development of a state
constitutional jurisprudence, but state interpreters neverthe-
less confront a host of problems for which constitutional
theorists supply no solutions. Yet these problems are not in-
superable. Through attention to the text of state provisions,
to their generating history, to their place in the state's over-
all constitutional design, and to their relation to earlier state
provisions as well as provisions in other states, state inter-
preters can develop a body of law that reflects the distinctive
traditions of state constitutionalism. 801
Dr. Tarr has identified an important perspective on state consti-
tutional interpretation and jurisprudence: No single theory will ex-
plain, justify or account for the developments of the New Judicial
Federalism." Outcomes will depend on the clarity as well as the dis-
tinctness of the state constitutional text (both in contrast to the fed-
eral and other state texts).," its character as an open-textured or
"great ordinance,"3°4 the presence of either general or specific state
constitutional history," precedents and judicial doctrines that have
been developed within the state in interpreting the state constitu-
tional provision at issue," precedents and judicial doctrines from
other states (particularly those from which the provision was copied)
with similar or identical provisions,307 judges' assessnients of "strategic
concerns,"" as well as, of course, judges' attitudes and "reasoned
300 See ,supra notes 77, 202.
301 TARR, supra note 75, al 208-09.
302 See id.
30' See id. at 185.
304 See id. at 187.
393 See id. at 192.
306 Sre TARR, supra note 75, at 197.
307 See id at 199.
508 Sager, supra note 135, am 974.
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judgment.""9 Each of these factors must be assessed and weighed
separately, and in relation to each other, leading to different ap-
proaches in different kinds of cases. 310 This is at least a partial answer
for those scholars who search for a single constitutional theory to ex-
plain the New Judicial Federalism, or who call on courts to follow a
single methodology."'
Whether one agrees with the outcome of Baker or not, it must be
conceded that the decision engages in a serious state constitutional
"discourse of distinctness,"312 albeit without resort to the values of the
current Vermont community. Interestingly the opinion reflects many
of the other state constitutional theories set forth by scholars and dis-
cussed here: Professor Kahn's "common enterprise ,"313 Justice Linde's
"fidelity to a constitution," 314 Professor Friedman's "dialogue," 315 Pro-
fessor Cover's "jurisdictional redundancy, "316 Professor Sager's "strate-
gic concerns,"317 Professor Morawetz's "autonomy rather than devia-
tion,"318 Professor Schapiro's "ideals defined by the constitution
itself,"319 Dean Rodriguez's "trans-state constitutional theory,"3" and
Professor Pope's "great ordinances."321 As Dr. Tarr suggests, it appears
that no single theory can account for the complexities of state consti-
tutional interpretation within the New Judicial Federalism. 322
CONCLUSION
Oregon Justice Hans A. Linde said that in order "to make an in-
dependent argument under the state clause [it] takes homework—in
texts, in history, in alternative approaches to analysis."323 The Vermont
Baker decision is one of the better examples of working with the ad-
vice given by Justice Linde a generation ago. Baker demonstrates the
application of virtually all of the lessons of the New Judicial Federal-
389 Bakez 744 A.2d at 879.
SeeTAau, supra note 75, at 209.
311 See, e.g., Landau, supra note. 96. See generally Williams, supra note 15.
312 Gardner, supra note 20, at 788.
313 Kahn, supra note 216, at 1168.
3 " Linde, Common Law?, supra note 228, at 228.
313 Friedman, supra note 231, at 137.
316 Cover, supra note 240, at 649.
317 Sager, supra note 135, at 974.
318 Morawetz, supra note 254, at 656.
319 Schapiro, supra note 265, at 393.
32° Rodriguez, supra note 277, at 291.
321 Pope, supra note 283, at 831.
322 TARR, supra note 75, at 209.
329 Linde, supra note 146, at 392.
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ism. The case provides a methodological primer with application far
beyond the merits of its substantive outcome. It is not merely a pro-
vincial, state-specific decision. Baker possibly will live up to the late Jus-
tice Thomas Hayes' hope that "decisions taken under Vermont's con-
stitution may give courage to another state to come to the same or
similar resolution under its constitution.” 324 Baker may prove to be not
only a source of courage, but also of some of the political and legal
tools necessary to accomplish legal change.
Eugene Rostow made a famous observation about the United
States Supreme Court in 1952: "The Supreme Court is, among other
things, an educational body, and the Justices are inevitably teachers in
a vital national setninar."525 Toward the end of the twentieth century,
and at the beginning of the twenty-first, state justices are taking their
seats at the head of the seminar table.
3" Hayes, supra note 18, at 153.
525 Eugene V. Rostow, The Democratic Character of Judicial Review, 66 FIiuv. L. REY, 193,
208 (1952).
